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Forecasting Skills in Experimental Markets: Illusion or Reality? 
 





Using experimental asset markets, we study the situation of a financial analyst who is 
trying to infer the fundamental value of an asset by observing the market’s history. We find 
that such capacity requires both standard cognitive skills (IQ) as well as social and 
emotional skills. However, forecasters with high emotional skills tend to perform worse 
when market mispricing is high as they tend to give too much emphasis to the noisy signals 
from market data. By contrast, forecasters with high social skills perform especially well in 
markets with high levels of mispricing in which their skills could help them detect possible 
manipulation attempts. Finally, males outperform females in the forecasting task after 
controlling for a large number of relevant individual characteristics such as risk attitudes, 
cognitive skills, emotional intelligence, and personality traits. 
Keywords: Forecasting, experimental asset markets, theory of mind, personality traits, 
cognitive skills. 
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Although fewer and fewer jobs involve direct trading of securities, a large number of tasks 
in the financial industry require understanding the economic implications of market prices. 
Forecasting is an essential part of the job of financial analysts and fund managers, as well 
as many professional economists (Elliott and Timmermann, 2008). However, this practical 
role of economists is in contradiction to the idea that markets are informationally efficient 
(Samuelson, 1965; Fama, 1965, 1970, 1991). If financial markets were informationally 
efficient, then no special skill would be needed to infer the current state of the economy 
from market prices. In the same vein, any success at forecasting market outcomes would 
simply be due to luck (Batchelor, 1990; Hartzmark, 1991; Barber and Odean, 2000; Malkiel, 
2003; Qu, Timmermann and Zhu, 2019), which Kahneman (2011) refers to as an illusion of 
skill. 
Nevertheless, few would disagree that actual markets are not perfectly efficient as was 
shown in both archival (e.g., De Bondt and Thaler, 1985, 1987; Lo and MacKinlay, 1988; 
Bernard and Thomas, 1990; Cutler, Poterba and Summer, 1991; Chopra, Lakonishok and 
Ritter, 1992; Jegadeesh and Titman, 1993, 1995; Shleifer, 2000; Lo, 2019) and 
experimental studies (e.g. Smith, Suchanek and Williams, 1988; Biais et al. 2005, Hanson, 
Oprea and Porter, 2006; Veiga and Vorsatz, 2010; Corgnet et al. 2018; Page and Siemroth, 
2017, 2018; Corgnet, DeSantis and Porter, 2020a). In the presence of mispricing, market 
prices become noisy signals creating a situation in which accurate forecasting might 
require genuine skills. In that context, what skills would economists and financial analysts 
need to possess to provide accurate forecasts? Surprisingly little is known about the 
individual characteristics driving forecasting performance. This lack of knowledge could, of 
course, be due to the absence of such skills (Kahneman, 2011). But, the seminal work of 
Bruguier, Quartz and Bossaerts, 2010; BQB henceforth, identifies specific forecasting skills 
related to emotional intelligence. More specifically, BQB show that one’s capacity to 
understand others’ emotions (Baron-Cohen et al. 1997) and ascribe intentions to 
apparently random patterns (Heider and Simmel, 1944) are key predictors of forecasting 
performance in an experimental asset market in which insiders were sometimes present. 
These skills have been referred to as theory of mind (Frith and Frith, 1999) because they 
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relate to one’s inclination to build a mental model of others’ behavior. The neurological 
study of BQB detected an activation in the paracingulate cortex, which is known to activate 
when inferring others’ intentions, for those forecasters who successfully predicted the 
direction of price changes. BQB also collected some behavioral data showing a positive 
correlation between theory of mind skills and forecasting performance.  
We aim to provide a more comprehensive assessment of the individual drivers of 
forecasting performance by extending the work of BQB, who only studied 43 participants in 
their behavioral experiment connecting theory of mind and reasoning test scores with 
forecasting performance. Using a larger sample, we assess the relative importance of 
theory of mind and other individual characteristics which were not studied by BQB, but 
have been found to explain financial behavior in archival or experimental studies. This 
includes standard cognitive skills, IQ (Raven, 1936) and cognitive reflection (Frederick, 
2005), risk attitudes (Crosetto and Filippin, 2013) as well as personality traits (Ashton, Lee 
and de Vries, 2014). To accomplish our goal, we showed participants data from previously-
conducted experimental markets. In these markets, traders bought and sold assets whose 
value depended on the state of the economy. The asset value was 50, 240 or 490 if the state 
of the economy was low, medium or high, respectively.  Traders were endowed with 
private information which, in aggregate, was sufficient to reveal the true state.  If markets 
are informationally efficient, then the asset’s price should equal its value (Plott and Sunder, 
1982, 1988). Participants were then asked to forecast the state of the economy using a 
quadratic scoring rule. In addition, we asked participants to make predictions in different 
settings in which we varied the type of market information that was displayed on the 
forecasters’ screens. We then linked participants’ forecasting performance to their 
individual characteristics.  
Our main findings support the hypothesis that theory of mind skills play a fundamental role 
in accounting for a person’s forecasting success. This result provides a strong robustness 
check for the findings in BQB because it was obtained with three times more observations 
than the original study and because we controlled for additional individual characteristics.1 
 
1 BQB’s ex-post power for the correlations between forecasting performance and their two theory of mind 
measures are 0.50 and 0.63, respectively.  
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Our second main result extends BQB by showing that standard cognitive skills, in particular 
IQ, also contribute to explaining forecasting performance. This finding is in line with the 
archival study of high-performing forecasters, so-called “superforecasters” (Tetlock and 
Gardner, 2016), who were found to possess high IQ levels. In addition, social skills, as 
measured by the extraversion personality trait (Ashton, Lee and de Vries, 2014), help 
explain forecasting performance. This result is consistent with previous research showing a 
positive link between self-monitoring scores (Snyder and Gangestad, 1986), which is 
closely linked to the personality trait of extraversion (Furnham, 1989; Osborn, Field and 
Veres, 1998), and traders’ earnings in double auctions (see Biais et al. 2005).  
Our findings that standard cognitive skills, as well as emotional and social skills, explain 
forecasting performance support the hypothesis that forecasting skills are real and not 
illusory. In addition, we layout specific mechanisms by which forecasting skills operate 
challenging further the idea that forecasting performance is just luck. 
2. Hypotheses 
Predicting asset prices accurately requires specific skills related to theory of mind, as 
shown by BQB. They found that theory of mind skills measured with a Heider-Simmel task 
(Heider and Simmel, 1944) and the eye-gaze test (Baron-Cohen et al. 1997) were 
significant predictors of forecasting performance. In their behavioral setup, forecasters had 
to predict the direction of price changes in markets that could be populated by insiders or 
not. In BQB, the ability of traders to assess the direction of price changes accurately thus 
crucially hinges upon their capacity to attend and extract traders’ private information. In 
related papers, Corgnet, DeSantis and Porter (2018) and Hefti, Heinke and Schneider 
(2018) have reported a positive effect of theory of mind skills on traders’ performance in 
experimental asset markets. These authors stress that traders with high theory of mind 
skills perceive market orders and prices as resulting from traders’ intentional actions. High 
theory of mind traders are thus especially attentive to market data and hence are more 
likely to extract valuable information from observed market activity. 
Because the effect of theory of mind skills crucially hinges upon extracting private 
information from observed market data, these skills will be especially beneficial when 
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mispricing in the market is low. By contrast, in markets with high mispricing, which is 
typical of markets where traders possess imprecise private information (Corgnet, DeSantis 
and Porter, 2020a), forecasters will not be able to learn much from market data. In the case 
of asset market bubbles where mispricing is particularly high, De Martino et al. (2013) 
show that theory of mind skills can be detrimental. Forecasters possessing high theory of 
mind skills tend to actively use market data and mistakenly infer information about the 
value of an asset from meaningless trends instead of recognizing that the market is driven 
by noise. This negative effect of theory of mind is also highlighted by Hefti, Heinke and 
Schneider (2018), who refer to market participants engaging in such behavior as being 
“semiotic.”  
Theory of mind skills closely relate to pattern recognition. Thus, high theory of mind 
traders tend to be influenced by market trends even when these trends do not reflect 
private information. A critical feature of the market that sustains this effect is the graphical 
display of market orders on the trading screen. This feature is often included in trading 
platforms such as the setup of De Martino et al. (2013). When real-time charts and orders 
are available on the screen, they prompt pattern recognition (Lo, Mamaysky and Wang, 
2000; Lo and Hasanhodzic, 2011), especially for people who possess high theory of mind 
(De Martino et al. 2013). It follows that theory of mind skills might hurt forecasting 
performance in cases in which both the graphical display of market orders is available to 
forecasters and mispricing levels are high. This leads to Hypothesis 1. 
Hypothesis 1 (Theory of Mind & Forecasting Performance) 
i) Theory of mind skills will enhance forecasting performance when mispricing is low.  
ii) Theory of mind skills will hurt forecasting performance when mispricing is high and the 
graphical display is complete.  
Our next hypothesis assesses the predictive power of cognitive skills in explaining 
forecasting performance. In particular, we focus on IQ and cognitive reflection because 
both have been found to explain financial performance consistently. IQ (or fluid 
intelligence) which measures one’s capacity to perform abstract mental calculations 
(Mackintosh and Mackintosh, 2011) has been shown to relate to stock market participation 
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and successful investment decisions (Kezdi and Willis, 2003; Cole and Shastry, 2009; 
Christelis, Jappelli, and Padula, 2010; Grinblatt, Keloharju, and Linnainmaa, 2011; 
Benjamin, Brown, and Shapiro, 2013). Using a unique database of adult Finnish men, 
Grinblatt, Keloharju, and Linnainmaa (2012) found that high-IQ people exhibited better 
market timing than their low-IQ counterparts, thus being more likely to buy winning stocks 
and sell losing stocks. In experimental asset markets with private information similar to the 
ones used in the current study, Corgnet, DeSantis and Porter (2018) show that high-IQ 
traders earned significantly more than low-IQ traders.2 Higher IQ test scores have also 
been found to correlate with fewer Bayesian updating errors (Charness, Rustichini, and van 
de Ven 2018; Corgnet, DeSantis and Porter, 2018) and with higher levels of strategic 
reasoning (Civelli and Deck, 2018).3 We thus predict that greater fluid intelligence should 
help forecasters infer the true asset value given market observables.  
At first, this prediction might seem at odds with the finding of BQB that participants’ scores 
on a reasoning task did not significantly explain forecasting performance. However, our 
forecasting task differs from BQB as they asked participants to predict the direction of 
price changes in the market. Instead, we ask them to uncover the true asset value based on 
market data. Our task thus requires Bayesian inference whereas theirs might not (see 
Corgnet, DeSantis and Porter, 2018). It follows that fluid intelligence, which is necessary for 
this type of inference, will help in predicting the state accurately. It is also interesting to 
highlight that the reasoning task used in BQB is not a measure of IQ but rather of cognitive 
reflection (or inhibitory control, Diamond, 2013).4 The null result of BQB regarding the 
predictive power of inhibitory control in their forecasting task might suggest cognitive 
reflection scores will not significantly predict forecasting performance in our setting. 
However, many experimental papers have stressed the predictive power of CRT scores on 
traders’ performance (see Breaban and Noussair, 2015; Corgnet et al. 2015; Noussair, 
 
2 Similar results are found by Hefti, Heinke and Schneider (2018) using the canonical design of Smith, 
Suchanek and Williams (1988) for exploring price bubbles in asset markets. 
3 High-IQ people have also been shown to induce greater truthful revelation in second price auctions (Lee et 
al. 2020). 
4 Although cognitive reflection scores correlate positively with IQ scores, both constructs are distinct because 
they relate to different executive functions. IQ can be seen as a measure of working memory whereas 
cognitive reflection relates to inhibitory control (Stanovich, 2011; Stanovich, 2016).  
7 
 
Tucker and Xu, 2016; Hanaki et al. 2017; Duchêne et al. 2019; Corgnet, DeSantis and Porter, 
2020a; Schneider and Porter, 2020). Similar to IQ scores, CRT scores have also been shown 
to positively relate to one’s ability to apply Bayes’ rule adequately (Oechssler, Roider and 
Schmitz, 2009; Hoppe and Kusterer, 2011; Toplak, West and Stanovich, 2011; Corgnet, 
DeSantis and Porter, 2018). Because Bayesian updating is key to inferring private 
information from market observables and thus inferring the true state, cognitive reflection 
should enhance forecasting performance. Yet, we might expect CRT scores to be less 
predictive of forecasting performance than IQ scores given the findings in BQB. One 
potential reason why cognitive reflection might play a lesser role in a forecasting task than 
in a trading task is that forecasters are explicitly instructed to interpret what is occurring in 
the market as opposed to traders who have to realize for themselves the value of 
forecasting for making profitable trades.5 
Similarly to theory of mind skills, the positive impact of standard cognitive skills on 
forecasting performance hinges upon extracting private information from market data. It 
follows that these skills will be especially relevant when individual traders possess a large 
amount of private information, and mispricing is low. Unlike theory of mind skills, standard 
cognitive skills have not been shown to induce pattern-following behaviors in the absence 
of relevant private information (Hefti, Heinke and Schneider, 2018). Thus, we do not expect 
fluid intelligence to hurt forecasting when mispricing is high.  
Finally, we do not expect the graphical display to have a major influence on the forecasting 
decisions of people possessing high standard cognitive skills. More generally, people with 
high CRT and IQ scores are less influenced by the framing of information when making 
decisions (Frederick, 2005; Toplak, West and Stanovich, 2011; Fosgaard, Hansen and 
Wengström, 2017). Unlike people possessing high theory of mind skills, we do not expect 
the graphical display of information to prompt pattern-recognition behaviors in people 
possessing high standard cognitive skills. We thus expect the graphical display of 
 
5 More generally, cognitive reflection measures how much attention one pays to a task. A tendency to reflect 




information not to moderate the effect of standard cognitive skills on forecasting 
performance. This leads to Hypothesis 2. 
Hypothesis 2 (Standard Cognitive Skills & Forecasting Performance) 
i) Fluid intelligence, and to a lesser extent cognitive reflection, will enhance forecasting 
performance when mispricing is low, regardless of the graphical display of information 
available to forecasters. 
ii) Standard cognitive skills will not enhance forecasting performance when mispricing is 
high, regardless of the graphical display of information available to forecasters.  
The finance literature has generally ignored personality traits despite recent works 
showing their relevance in explaining individual economic success (see Borghans et al. 
2008; Barrick and Mount, 2009; Almlund et al. 2011; Heckman and Kautz, 2012; Corgnet, 
Hernan and Mateo, 2015). The experimental economics literature has also shown 
correlations between personality traits and strategic sophistication (Gill and Prowse, 
2016). The authors show that agreeable and emotionally stable people tend to be more 
strategically sophisticated in beauty contest games because they played numbers closer to 
the Nash equilibrium. 
Only a few papers have studied the impact of personality traits on traders’ earnings and 
strategies in experimental markets. One such study, Biais et al. (2005), shows self-
monitoring explains traders’ performance.6 More specifically, Biais et al. (2005, p. 298) 
claim that people who score high on self-monitoring “may assume that other market 
participants are also behaving strategically and trying to manipulate the market as they do. 
Accordingly, high self-monitors should be less likely to take market prices at face value, and 
will reason about the signals and strategies that generated them.” Even when traders are 
not explicitly incentivized to manipulate prices (as in Hanson, Oprea and Porter, 2006), 
they can place orders that contradict their private information so as to distort prices and 
thus trade advantageously (Biais et al. 2005). Self-monitoring skills are likely to be 
especially critical in markets in which mispricing is high and attempts to distort prices are 
 
6 Snyder and Gangestad (1986) refer to self-monitoring as a stable personality trait which is defined as one’s 
inclination to attend social cues. 
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likely. By definition, markets with low mispricing have not experienced successful 
manipulation attempts, and as such, self-monitoring is unlikely to help forecasters. By 
contrast with theory of mind and standard cognitive skills, self-monitoring will lead traders 
to downplay the role of prices as valuable signals of the true asset value. 
Self-monitoring closely relates to extraversion, one of the five fundamental personality 
traits (Lippa, 1976; John, Donahue, and Kentle, 1991; John, Naumann and Soto, 2008; 
Ashton, Lee and de Vries, 2014). Heckman and Kautz (2012) define extraversion as “an 
orientation of one’s interests and energies toward the outer world of people and things 
rather than the inner world of subjective experience, characterized by positive affect and 
sociability.” Self-monitoring has been found to correlate positively and substantially with 
extraversion (see Furnham, 1989; Osborn, Field and Veres, 1998) whereas other 
personality traits such as conscientiousness, openness, agreeableness or neuroticism have 
not. 
Interestingly, the only personality trait that has been shown to correlate positively with 
portfolio earnings of individual investors is extraversion (Lo, Repin and Steenbarger, 2005; 
Durand, Newby and Sanghani, 2008). Using the data from these studies, we show that 
individual investors score particularly high on extraversion compared to a large sample of 
adults and university students (see Appendix A). This suggests extraversion might play an 
important role in investors’ success. In this study, we decided to measure extraversion 
instead of self-monitoring because of its broader use and its psychometric properties (Lee 
and Ashton, 2004). 
Finally, the effect of extraversion is unlikely to be affected by the graphical display of 
information. This is the case because extraversion, unlike theory of mind skills, does not 
relate to one’s inclination for reading patterns. For example, extrovert forecasters who 
observe a rising price trend will not infer a high asset value if they correctly believe traders 
are manipulators or trend-followers who place orders based on something other than 





Hypothesis 3 (Extraversion & Forecasting Performance)  
i) Extraversion will enhance forecasting performance when mispricing is high, regardless 
of the graphical display of information available to forecasters. 
ii) Extraversion will not enhance forecasting performance when mispricing is low, 
regardless of the graphical display of information available to forecasters.  
Our hypotheses contribute to the current literature by establishing distinct mechanisms by 
which individual drivers of financial behavior such as emotional skills, cognitive ability, and 
personality traits might operate. We test these mechanisms in a laboratory setting in which 
we can manipulate mispricing levels in markets and the graphical display of information 
available to forecasters. 
 
3. Design 
The experiment was conducted in three phases: Instructions, Forecasting Task and 
Questionnaire. The full set of instructions is available in Appendix B. 
3.1. Instruction phase 
The participants were recruited from a pool of individuals who had previously traded in an 
experimental asset market in the style of Plott and Sunder (1982 or 1988).7 In Phase 1, the 
participants were reminded that they had previously participated in a relevant market 
experiment in which a single asset was traded for 5 minutes. This asset paid a liquidating 
dividend of either 50, 240, or 490 at the end of the market period with probabilities 
commonly known among the 12 traders in the market. Private signals of the form “Not 50”, 
“Not 240”, and “Not 490” were available to the traders in these markets. In Plott and 
Sunder (1982)-style markets, some traders were fully-informed meaning they were given 
two of these signals at the beginning of the period so that they knew the true asset value 
with certainty. The other traders were uninformed in that they did not receive private 
signals. In Plott and Sunder (1988)-style markets, all traders were partially-informed, 
meaning that each received exactly one private signal, but half received one signal and the 
 
7 We recruited participants who were experienced in trading to ensure they would understand the financial 
environment in which they had to make forecasts. 
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other half received the other possible signal. Thus, in aggregate, the participants had 
complete information.  
Participants were given a reminder of how the double auction trading market worked as 
well as the basic private signal and asset value structures. They completed two unpaid 
practice markets lasting five minutes. In the first practice market, participants were 
informed that all traders would be partially informed. In the second practice market, they 
were informed that one-half of the traders would be fully informed. As in the historic 
markets, these markets were conducted with groups of 12 participants. At the conclusion 
of the second practice market, participants were informed that they would be shown past 
experimental sessions and be asked to make inferences about what they observed.  An 
incentivized three-question comprehension quiz was then administered ($0.50 per correct 
answer). Upon completion of the quiz, a monitor read the solutions to the participants and 
publicly answered any questions.  
3.2. Forecasting task 
In Phase 2, participants were placed in the role of a forecaster observing data from a 
previous financial market experiment (market data taken from Corgnet, DeSantis, and 
Porter, 2018 and 2020a).8 The forecasters’ main task was to predict the true value of the 
asset being traded in the observed markets. 
Of the available data from Corgnet, DeSantis, and Porter (2018 and 2020a), 12 sessions 
were randomly selected: four (out of 10) of the sessions in which there were 12-partially 
informed traders, four (out of 10) of the sessions in which there were 6-fully informed 
traders, and four (out of 5) of the sessions in which there were only 2-fully informed 
traders.9 Five market periods were then randomly drawn from each of these sessions. 
These five market periods from a single historic session were grouped together and treated 
as a single “block.” The ordering of the blocks (five periods from a historic session) and the 
ordering of the markets within a block were randomized for each participant. That is, each 
participant observed a (different) random sequence of the 12 historic sessions listed above. 
 
8 Due to a recruitment error, six of the 125 participants in the current study actually participated in Corgnet, 
DeSantis, and Porter (2018 or 2020a).  
9 The parentheses report the number of historic markets of the given type that were conducted by Corgnet, 
DeSantis, and Porter (2018 and 2020a).   
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Moreover, each participant observed a (different) random sequence of the five markets 
within each historic session. That said, all participants observed data from the same 60 
market periods. 
Participants forecast the true asset value for each market they observed by assigning a 
probability, Probv, to each of the three possible asset values: 𝑣𝑣 ∈ 𝑉𝑉 ≔ {50, 240, 490}.10 
Upon conclusion of a block, participants were asked to forecast two additional 
characteristics of the original session from which the five (just observed) markets were 
drawn. First, participants assigned probabilities to each of the three possible information 
structures: 12-partially informed, 6-fully informed, and 2-fully informed. Second, 
participants assigned probabilities to the number of participants in the original session 
who had high CRT scores.11 In addition to allowing us to examine forecasters’ beliefs about 
the group of traders they just observed, this served to reinforce to the forecaster that each 
block of five markets was from a distinct group of traders.  
A quadratic scoring rule was used for each elicited belief (60 forecasts of true asset value, 
12 forecasts of information structure, and 12 forecasts of CRT level). The payment per 
question was determined via the following equation:  
1
2
�1 + 2 × 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐 −� 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑣𝑣2
𝑣𝑣∈𝑉𝑉
� 
where Probcorrect is the probability the forecaster assigned to the true asset value. Thus, the 
payment per question could range between $0.00 for a guess that placed all probability on 
an incorrect value and $1.00 for a guess that placed all probability on the correct value, 
while placing equal weight on all values would result in a payoff of $0.67. Participants were 
informed of the correct answer after submitting a forecast. Thus, they received immediate 
feedback regarding the accuracy of their forecast.  
 
 
10 In addition to the market activity, forecasters were given the same commonly known probabilities (35%, 
45%, and 20%) as the traders about the asset being worth 50, 240, or 490.  
11 Corgnet, DeSantis, and Porter (2018 and 2020a) administered a seven-question CRT survey to participants 
in the original sessions. Our forecasters were asked to predict how many of the original traders answered at 
least four of the seven CRT questions correctly: 0 to 4, 5 to 8, and 9 to 12. Our forecasters were provided with 




In Phase 3, participants completed a series of six surveys: (1) Heider-Simmel Test, (2) 
Cognitive Ability Test, (3) Bomb Risk Elicitation Task, (4) Eye-Gaze Test, (5) HEXACO 
Personality Test, and (6) Demographic Questions. Because each of the subjects participated 
as a trader in a previous market experiment in which the CRT was administered, we used 
the previously collected score instead of re-administering the test.12 
The Heider-Simmel Test (HS test, henceforth) is one of the two tasks which have commonly 
been used to assess theory of mind skills (Bossaerts, Suzuki and O’Doherty, 2019). It was 
operationalized in a manner similar to Bruguier et al. (2010). Participants watched a video 
in 5-second intervals of three geometric objects: a circle and two triangles. After each 
interval, the video was paused for 10 seconds, and participants were asked to forecast 
whether, after the next 5-second interval, the large triangle was going to be closer to, 
farther from, or at the same distance from the small triangle. Participants were paid $1 for 
each correct answer and incurred a $0.25 penalty for not responding within the 10 
seconds. Participants made a maximum of 14 guesses in this task. 
The Cognitive Ability Test (Intelligence test, henceforth) was adapted from Civelli and Deck 
(2018). In this test, participants were shown a three-by-three table of images with the 
image in the lower right corner missing. Participants were asked to select the image (from 
a given set of images) that logically completes the pattern similarly to the Raven (1936) 
test. Participants were given six minutes to answer 12 such questions. Each correct answer 
was worth $0.50. 
The Bomb Risk Elicitation Task (BRET, henceforth) is adapted from Crosetto and Filippin 
(2013).13 In this test, participants were shown a seven-by-seven square grid of boxes. A 
bomb was randomly placed behind one of the 49 boxes. Participants were instructed to 
select a number between 1 and 49, indicating the number of boxes they wished to collect 
 
12 Corgnet, DeSantis and Porter (2015) administered the CRT at the conclusion of their experimental sessions. 
The authors note that some of their participants had previously taken the CRT. They do not find significant 
differences between these individuals’ two scores. Thus, the decision was made to reduce the length of the 
overall experiment rather than recollecting the CRT measure from the participants. 
13 We opted for this risk elicitation tool because it provides a granular partition of risk attitudes while only 
requiring a single decision.  Tasks that involve more questions can yield data inconsistent with standard 
models of risk or impose structure on the decision maker.     
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(collection occurred left to right then top to bottom). If the bomb was behind one of the 
collected boxes, then the participant earned $0.00 for this task. If the bomb was not behind 
one of the collected boxes, then the participant earned $0.10 for each collected box. 
Participants were given two minutes to complete this task. Even though we do not have a 
specific hypothesis regarding the effect of risk attitudes on forecasting performance, we 
included it as a control. Risk attitudes have been shown to relate to financial behavior in 
experimental markets accounting for lower bids on risky assets (e.g. Fellner and 
Maciejovsky, 2007; Breaban and Noussair, 2015). 
The Eye-Gaze Test is adapted from Baron-Cohen et al. (1997) and is another task 
commonly used to assess theory of mind skills. Participants were shown ten sets of eyes 
(Olderbak et al. 2015) and instructed to select the word (from a list of four) that best 
described what the person in the image was thinking or feeling.14 Because Baron-Cohen et 
al. (1997) provide a list of correct answers which had been previously validated, we can 
calculate a performance score for this test. Participants were given six minutes to complete 
this task, which was not incentivized.15  
The HEXACO Personality Test asks participants to decide on a scale of 1 (strongly disagree) 
to 5 (strongly agree) how much they agreed with each of several statements.16 This survey 
assesses 6 major dimensions of personality (Honesty-Humility, Emotionality, Extraversion, 
Agreeableness, Conscientiousness, and Openness to Experience).17 Participants were given 
10 minutes to complete the 60 questions. 
Demographic Questions consisted of the following three items: (1) What is your gender? 
(2) Do you regularly look at stock prices? (3) In what school are you enrolled?  
 
14 This is a short version of the original 36-item test. But, Corgnet, DeSantis, and Porter (2018 and 2020a) 
administered the full-version of the eye-gaze test in the original sessions so that we also have this score in our 
database. In the results section, we use the 36-item score although no significant differences are found when 
using the 10-item version. 
15 Although it is standard not to incentivize this test (Baron-Cohen et al. 1997; Corgnet, DeSantis and Porter, 
2018), BQB paid for performance. 
16 See http://hexaco.org/hexaco-inventory for more details regarding the HEXACO personality test. 
17 Although the literature does not suggest any hypotheses regarding the predictive power for personality 
traits beyond extraversion, we decided to measure all traits. This is first motivated by the methodological 
concern of conducting the HEXACO test in its standard form rather than isolating a subset of questions. 
Second, this allows us to test whether the predictive power of extraversion continues to hold when 
controlling for other personality traits (see for example, Appendix C, Table C4).  
15 
 
3.4. Treatments  
We utilized a 3×4 factorial design to test our three hypotheses. To that end, the design 
exogenously manipulates the structure of information to induce different levels of 
mispricing (within-subject design on 3 levels). It also varies the graphical display of 
information presented to forecasters (between-subject design on 4 levels). With either 31 
or 32 forecasters per graphical display each making 20 forecasts for each of 3 information 
structures, we observe a total of 7,500 forecasts for an average of 625 forecasts per 
combination of graphical display and information structure. 
3.4.1. Mispricing  
Mispricing was exogenously manipulated in each experimental session by having 
participants make forecasts under three possible information structures: 12-partially 
informed, 6-fully informed, and 2-fully informed. Corgnet, DeSantis and Porter (2020a) show 
that prices closely track fundamentals in markets where one-half of the traders are insiders 
(6-fully informed). In contrast, private information is not aggregated in the 12-partially 
informed and 2-fully informed markets. In related experiments, Bossaerts, Frydman and 
Ledyard (2014) show that mispricing decreases as the number of fully-informed traders in 
the market increases.18 To assess mispricing, we calculate the average across markets of 
the mean absolute deviation (MAD) between the price and the true asset value. MAD values 
are similar for the 12-partially informed and 2-fully informed markets (averages of 147.899 
and 155.020, respectively, and p-value = 0.871 from the Wilcoxon Rank Sum Test), and 
both are significantly higher than the MAD values for the 6-fully informed markets (average 
of 60.031, p-values<0.001 for the two pairwise comparisons using Wilcoxon Rank Sum 
Tests). In the subsequent analysis, we will conduct a median split of markets based on 
MAD, and using markets with different information structures assures considerable 
heterogeneity of MAD across all markets.   
3.4.2. Graphical display 
The second design dimension corresponds to the nature of the graphical display shown to 
the forecasters. There were four variations of a forecaster’s screen based upon 
 
18 One major difference with our setup is that they explicitly allow for gains from exchange. 
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combinations of two distinct features (see Figures B1 to B4 in Appendix B). The order book, 
which displays bids and asks (see Offers to Sell and Offers to Buy on the right side of Figure 
B1 in Appendix B), was either visible (Book treatments) or not visible (No Book 
treatments). The market charts were either displayed dynamically (Dynamic treatments) 
or statically (Static treatments). In Dynamic treatments, the participants observed a time-
compressed 30-second video replay of the market that originally lasted for 5 minutes. In 
Static, the participants were shown the final image from the market replay video for 30 
seconds. While forecasters could assign probabilities for each possible true asset value at 
any point during the 30-second observation window, they could not submit the 
probabilities until the 30 seconds had elapsed.  
In total, we had four different treatments varying the graphical display of information: 
Dynamic – Book, Dynamic – No Book, Static – Book, and Static – No Book. Given the specifics 
of our experimental design, we derive the following predictions based on our three 
hypotheses. 
3.5. Predictions 
Table 1 summarizes the relationship between our design and hypotheses. Hypothesis 1 
puts forth that theory of mind skills will boost forecasting performance when mispricing is 
low, and the graphical display of information available to forecasters is complete (see cell 
Dynamic – Book & 6-fully informed in Table 1). By contrast, Hypothesis 1 posits a negative 
effect of theory of mind skills when mispricing is high and the graphical display of 
information available to forecasters is complete (see cell Dynamic – Book & 12-partially 
informed / 2-fully informed in Table 1). For the rest of the cases, we do not state a 
directional prediction for the effect of theory of mind skills on forecasting performance.  
Hypothesis 2 posits that standard cognitive skills will boost forecasting performance when 
mispricing is low regardless of graphical display (see low mispricing cells in Table 1) 
whereas no effect is expected for high mispricing levels. 
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Hypothesis 3 emphasizes that extraversion will boost forecasting performance when 
mispricing is high regardless of graphical display (see high mispricing cells in Table 1) 
whereas no effect is expected for low mispricing levels. 
Although the 12-partially informed and 2-fully informed treatments differ in the structure of 
information, they exhibit identical mispricing (Corgnet, DeSantis and Porter, 2020a). 
Because our conjectures emphasize mispricing rather than information structure as a key 
driver of the impact of individual skills on forecasting performance, we do not expect 
differences between these two treatments (see Table 1). However, we decided to include 
both in our design to provide an additional robustness check. 







 12-partially informed  
2-fully informed 
Incomplete 
Static – No Book 
Theory of mind (=) 
Intelligence & CRT (+) 
Extraversion (=) 
Theory of mind (=) 
Intelligence & CRT (=) 
Extraversion (+) 
Intermediate 
Dynamic – No Book 
Static – Book 
Theory of mind (=) 
Intelligence & CRT (+) 
Extraversion (=) 
Theory of mind (=) 
Intelligence & CRT (=) 
Extraversion (+) 
Complete 
Dynamic – Book 
Theory of mind (+) 
Intelligence & CRT (+) 
Extraversion (=) 
Theory of mind (-) 
Intelligence & CRT (=) 
Extraversion (+) 
Each cell corresponds to a level of mispricing and a level of graphical display. Signs (+ / - / =) refer to 
whether a given set of skills (theory of mind, intelligence & CRT, and extraversion) will enhance / 
hinder / leave unaffected forecasting performance in a given cell. 
3.6. Procedures 
A total of 125 participants completed this study in 6 sessions. The average earnings of the 
participants were $49.85.19 This includes average payments of $0.66 for the 
 
19 The exchange rate was 1 experimental dollar equals US$ 1 in sessions 1 and 2 (12 and 24 participants). It 
was 1 experimental dollar equals US$ 0.50 in sessions 3 through 6 (24 participants in sessions 3, 4 and 5, and 
18 in session 6). This exchange rate adjustment was made to keep average earnings in the range dictated by 
lab policy. In our analyses, we include session fixed effects which control for differences in exchange rates as 
well as other idiosyncratic session-specific shocks. 
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comprehension quiz in Phase 1, $33.95 for Phase 2 (forecasting task), and $8.24 for Phase 3 
(questionnaire). In addition, participants were given a $7 participation payment for the 2-
hour study. 
Each experimental session was conducted with either 12 or 24 participants, and each 
participant was randomly assigned to one of the four between-subject treatments 
(Dynamic – Book, Dynamic – No Book, Static – Book and Static – No Book) conditional on the 
number of people in a session assigned to a treatment being equal.20 This ensures that the 
observations are balanced across treatments and it reduces any impact of session effects on 
treatment effects.  
Participants were drawn from a pool of approximately 670 participants at the Economic 
Science Institute at Chapman University who had previously participated in a Plott and 
Sunder (1982 or 1988)-style market.21  
4. Results 
We start by providing a correlation matrix for our main predictors of forecasting 
performance: theory of mind skills (as measured with the HS and the eye-gaze tests), 




20 One session was run with 18 participants in which case the treatment assignment was not fully balanced. 
For the practice market periods, these participants were divided into two groups of nine. In session 5, one of 
the 24 participants exited halfway through Phase 2 of the experiment so that we had to drop this observation 
from the analyses.   
21 While the historic data used in this experiment closely followed the designs of Plott and Sunder 
(1982,1988), some of our participants had participated in variations of these markets in which traders had 
the ability to either purchase signals (Corgnet et al. 2018) or chat with other participants (Corgnet, DeSantis 
and Porter, 2020b). 
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Table 2. Correlations (p-values) between individual skills 
 HS Eye-gaze Intelligence CRT 
Eye-gaze -0.094 (0.297) 1 
  
















In line with previous research, the correlation between CRT and intelligence score is 
positive and significant (see e.g. Toplak, West and Stanovich, 2011; Corgnet, DeSantis and 
Porter, 2018). The point estimate of 0.318 is very close to the correlation of 0.35 between 
CRT score and intelligence reported in Corgnet, DeSantis and Porter (2018). Toplak, West 
and Stanovich (2011) report correlation coefficients of 0.32 and 0.33 when looking at the 
relationship between other measures of fluid intelligence and CRT scores. The other 
significant correlation coefficient is the one between CRT and HS scores. Correlation 
between these variables has not been previously reported in the literature to the best of 
our knowledge. The absence of correlation between the eye-gaze test and CRT is also 
consistent with Corgnet, DeSantis and Porter (2018). Also, in line with BQB, we report a 
small and insignificant correlation between performance on the eye-gaze and HS tests.22 As 
is highlighted by Bossaerts, Suzuki and O’Doherty (2019, p. 193), the two tests differ 
because, unlike HS, the eye-gaze test is not merely ‘‘as if’’ since it displays actual 
intentionality. By contrast, the HS test represents a situation in which the intentionality 
ascribed to the movement of geometric shapes is only “as if”. Bossaerts, Suzuki and 
O’Doherty (2019) also posit that the HS test more closely represents the flow of 
transactions in a market setting because “(…) while each subject could be considered 
intentional, the result of their interactions is not.” We also note that the mean score for 
each of the five skills listed in Table 2 did not differ between the Incomplete, Intermediate, 
 
22 BQB report a correlation coefficient ρ = 0.019 (p-value = 0.904). Hefti, Heinke and Schneider (2018) report 
a significant yet similarly small correlation coefficient between the two tests: ρ = 0.051. 
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and Complete graphical display treatment groups, which is the only dimension of the 
experimental design that was administered between-subjects.23     
Next, we move to forecaster performance.  Table 3 reports the average forecasted expected 
value of the asset conditional on the actual true value by the combination of graphical 
display and mispricing. Table 3 shows that forecasts systematically increased in the true 
asset value, thus reflecting that forecasters were able to extract valuable information from 
the market. This is a necessary condition for individual skills to matter in explaining 
forecasters’ performance. Not surprisingly, forecasts more accurately reflected the true 
asset value in markets with low levels of mispricing. 
 Table 3. Average forecasted expected value of the asset for each treatment when the true 







 12-partially informed  
2-fully informed 
Incomplete 
Static – No Book (114.94, 254.92, 410.06) (233.48, 268.10, 281.63) 
Intermediate 
Dynamic – No Book 
Static – Book 
(101.95, 244.71, 417.20) (227.58, 255.59, 276.95) 
Complete 
Dynamic – Book (107.48, 250.15, 405.52) (232.57, 257.58, 265.90) 
We define two measurements of forecasting performance. We refer to the price forecasting 
error as the difference (in absolute terms) between the predicted expected value of the 
asset based on the probabilities reported and the true asset value. Our alternative 
forecasting performance measure is referred to as the weight forecasting accuracy and is 
equal to the weight the forecaster assigned to the true state (50, 240 or 490).  
In our statistical analyses, we conduct panel regressions with subject random effects and 
fixed effects for session (1 to 6) as well as decision period (1 to 60).24 We used robust 
 
23 Specifically, regression analysis yields p-values > 0.15 when testing that mean scores are the same across 
graphical display treatments for each of the five individual skills. 
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standard errors at the individual level. In total, we collected 7,500 observations 
corresponding to 125 forecasters making 60 decisions each.25 We run separate regressions 
for each characteristic to avoid issues of collinearity due to the large correlation 
coefficients, as reported in Table 2, between CRT and intelligence scores, and between CRT 
and HS scores.26 Each of the dummy variables in our regression tables take the value of 1 if 
the given characteristic was present for an individual forecast and takes the value of 0 
otherwise. For example, the “Book Dummy” variable takes value 1 if a forecaster’s screen 
displayed the book of orders, while “Two Insiders Dummy” takes value 1 if the market was 
populated by two fully-informed and 10 uninformed traders. 
Table 4 reveals that pooling over all treatments, each of the individual characteristics 
significantly predicts price forecasting performance, except for the eye-gaze test.27 In BQB, 
the predictive power of the eye-gaze test was significant though smaller in magnitude than 
HS. Taken together, these results suggest theory of mind skills related to pattern 
recognition (HS) are critical for explaining forecasting performance whereas theory of 
mind skills related to the reading of emotions (eye-gaze scores) are not. Regarding CRT, its 
predictive power is only marginally significant (see regression (2)) and its standardized 
coefficient is about 30% smaller than the coefficients for intelligence, HS, and extraversion. 
In addition, we note that men outperform women in all the regressions in Table 4, and this 
result is generally robust to alternative specifications (see Appendix C). In particular, we 
show that the gender effect is robust to controlling for various individual characteristics 
such as personality traits and risk attitudes (see Table C4). The size of the gender effect is, 
however, moderate (Cohen’s d  = 0.32 (0.39) for price forecasting error (weight forecasting 
accuracy)). Finally, forecasting performance is generally worse in markets in which 
mispricing is high (see positive (negative) and significant coefficient for “Two Insiders 
Dummy” (“Six Insiders Dummy”)), the true asset value is high (see positive and significant 
 
24 Because of space constraints, we do not provide the coefficient estimates for these fixed effects. 
Importantly, decision period fixed effects do not show evidence of learning over the course of the experiment. 
25 Due to a programming error, a total of six observations were lost, two forecasts from each of three 
forecasters. Therefore, subsequent analyses rely on 7,494 observations.  
26 In Appendix C, we extend these analyses to the case in which all characteristics are included in a single 
regression (see Tables C2 and C3). 
27 Table C2 in Appendix C repeats this analysis with each individual characteristic simultaneously. In that 
specification only intelligence score and extraversion remain significant. 
22 
 
coefficient for “Asset Value”) and the graphical display is complete (see positive and 
significant coefficient for “Book & Dynamics Dummy”).28 
Table 4. Price forecasting error as predicted by individual characteristics separately 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
      
Intelligence score 
(std) 
-2.34**     
 (1.15)     
CRT score (std)  -1.60*    
  (0.96)    
HS score (std)   -2.18**   
   (1.11)   
Eye-gaze score (std)    0.66  
    (1.25)  
Extraversion (std)     -2.24** 
     (0.96) 
Male Dummy -4.90** -4.20* -4.86** -4.41* -4.12* 
 (2.33) (2.41) (2.40) (2.40) (2.32) 
Book Dummy -1.96 -2.24 -1.85 -1.87 -1.54 
 (3.28) (3.30) (3.21) (3.27) (3.30) 
Dynamics Dummy -0.24 -0.69 -0.31 -0.38 -0.69 
 (2.74) (2.72) (2.70) (2.77) (2.73) 
Book & Dynamics 
Dummy 
9.16** 9.34** 8.22* 8.44* 8.01* 
 (4.33) (4.35) (4.31) (4.31) (4.30) 
Two Insiders Dummy 15.01*** 15.01*** 15.01*** 15.01*** 15.02*** 
 (1.93) (1.93) (1.93) (1.93) (1.92) 
Six Insiders Dummy -87.81*** -87.81*** -87.81*** -87.81*** -87.81*** 
 (2.01) (2.01) (2.01) (2.01) (2.01) 
Asset Value 0.12*** 0.12*** 0.12*** 0.12*** 0.12*** 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Constant 103.77*** 104.57*** 105.26*** 104.21*** 103.75*** 
 (9.04) (9.16) (9.29) (9.14) (9.09) 
Observations 7,494 7,494 7,494 7,494 7,494 
R-squared 0.226 0.225 0.226 0.225 0.226 
Chi-squared 6,170 6,283 6,223 6,135 6,129 
Robust standard errors in parentheses with session and time fixed effects included as well as random effects for 
each subject.  (std) indicates a standardized variable. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
 
28 The negative effect of the complete graphical display on forecasting performance might seem 
counterintuitive. However, Hypothesis 1 suggests this could be due to the negative effect of theory of mind 
skills on forecasting performance when mispricing is high and the graphical display is complete. 
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In Table C1 in Appendix C, we report similar results using our alternate measure of 
forecasting performance (weight forecasting accuracy) with the exception that the 
coefficient associated with CRT becomes insignificant (p-value = 0.185).  In Appendix C, we 
also provide robustness checks for these results. In particular, we conduct regressions in 
which all predictors are included so as to assess the relative predictive power of each 
individual characteristic (Tables C2 and C3). In line with previous findings, intelligence, HS 
and extraversion appear to have consistent explanatory power for forecasting 
performance. We also show that our findings continue to hold when adding individual 
controls, such as personality traits (HEXACO), and risk attitudes (BRET) (see Table C4). 
None of these additional controls predict forecasting performance, but the general patterns 
observed in Table 4 remain. In addition, our findings hold when using median splits (see 
Tables C5 to C8) and quartiles (see Tables C9 to C12) to define individual skills.  
Finally, we show that the predictors of forecasting performance continue to be significant 
even after controlling for market characteristics such as average price and trading volume 
(see Table C13 in Appendix C).29 This means that individual characteristics can help 
forecasters predict the true asset value better than a simple statistical model based on 
market observables. Interestingly, the relative importance of extraversion as a predictor of 
forecasting performance compared to HS and intelligence scores increases when 
controlling for market variables. Indeed, the standardized coefficients for HS and 
intelligence scores decrease by about 10 to 15% whereas the coefficients for extraversion 
increase by about 15% (see coefficients in Table C13 and Tables C2 and C3, regression (3)). 
This observation is consistent with the fact that, as is argued in our hypotheses section, the 
predictive power of theory of mind and intelligence scores rely upon accurately inferring 
the true asset value from market observables. Thus, controlling for market variables should 
automatically lower the incremental predictive power of theory of mind and intelligence 
test scores. By contrast, the predictive power of extraversion does not readily depend on 
inferring private information from prices but on the ability to identify attempts to distort 
prices and discard noisy signals. Because a simple statistical model of market observables 
 
29 We consider all the predictors which are significant in Tables C2 and C3, which is where we include all 
individual characteristics in the same regression. Similar results are obtained if we also include eye-gaze test 
and CRT scores. 
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is unlikely to capture this complex phenomenon, it is not surprising that extraversion 
performs relatively better than other skills when controlling for market observables. We 
state our first result as follows. 
Result 1 (Individual Skills & Forecasting Performance) 
Theory of mind (HS), standard cognitive skills, and extraversion significantly explain 
forecasting performance. 
Next, we test Hypothesis 1i by assessing the conditions under which theory of mind skills 
predict forecasting performance. In Table 5, we assess the predictive power of theory of 
mind skills (HS) across markets varying in their level of mispricing, as measured by MAD. 
In regression (1) [(2)], we consider the markets for which the MAD value was below 
[above] the median value of all markets. In line with Hypothesis 1i, we show that theory of 
mind skills matter most when mispricing is low. Indeed, the coefficient for “HS score (std) × 
MAD” in regression (3) is positive and significant so that more mispricing induces higher 
forecasting errors for people who earned higher scores on the HS test. Similar findings are 
obtained using weight forecasting accuracy as the dependent variable (see Table C14 in 
Appendix C) and when adding individual and market controls to the regression analysis 
(see Tables C15 and C16 in Appendix C). The results in regression (3) of Table 5 also hold 
when using the interaction variable “HS score (std) × MAD Dummy”, where MAD Dummy 
takes value one if the MAD of the market is above the median MAD of all markets (see Table 
C21). We should also note that, in line with Result 1 showing a limited predictive power of 
the eye-gaze test on forecasting performance, the findings of Table 5 do not hold in that 
case (see p-value = 0.336 in Table C17 in Appendix C for “Eye-gaze score (std) × MAD”). It is 
interesting to note that the behavioral experiment in BQB (n = 43) seems to indicate a 
possibly stronger relationship between theory of mind scores and forecasting performance 
for HS than for the eye-gaze test (see Figures 4 and 5 in BQB). In addition, BQB posit that 
the close connection between pattern recognition skills and theory of mind is crucial to 
understanding why theory of mind skills predict forecasting performance in markets. 
Because HS is a more direct measure of people’s inherent inclination for pattern 
recognition than the eye-gaze test, that HS fares better might not be that unsurprising.30 
 
30 In line with our findings (see Table 2), BQB, do not find a significant correlation between performance on 
the eye-gaze and HS tests. 
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HS score (std) -4.11*** -0.46 -5.27*** 
 (1.38) (1.84) (1.44) 
HS score (std) × MAD   0.03** 
   (0.01) 
MAD   0.78*** 
   (0.01) 
Male Dummy -4.71 -4.87 -4.82** 
 (3.10) (3.92) (2.40) 
Book Dummy -2.12 -1.42 -1.73 
 (4.56) (4.51) (3.19) 
Dynamics Dummy 3.08 -3.45 -0.32 
 (4.16) (4.76) (2.68) 
Book & Dynamics Dummy 4.82 10.77 8.18* 
 (5.94) (6.67) (4.30) 
Two Insiders Dummy 22.11*** -2.22 7.69*** 
 (2.76) (2.61) (1.87) 
Six Insiders Dummy -10.80*** -101.49*** -20.84*** 
 (2.72) (3.67) (2.24) 
Asset Value -0.04*** 0.04*** -0.03*** 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Constant 42.20*** 213.68*** 35.11*** 
 (8.37) (9.33) (6.68) 
Observations 3,746 3,748 7,494 
R-squared 0.077 0.176 0.543 
Chi-squared 485.7 2,287 14,818 
Robust standard errors in parentheses with session and time fixed effects included as well as random 
effects for each subject.  (std) indicates a standardized variable. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
To test Hypothesis 1ii, we replicate Table 5 for cases in which the graphical display 
available to forecasters is either complete (i.e., the book is displayed along with dynamic 
charts) or not (i.e., either the book or the dynamic charts are not displayed). We find 
supporting evidence for Hypothesis 1ii because the interaction effect between mispricing 
and HS scores appears to be moderated by the extent of the graphical display available to 
forecasters. Indeed, the interaction coefficient “HS score (std) × MAD” in regressions (5) 
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and (6) in Table 6 is only significant and positive when the complete display is provided 
suggesting that it helps individuals with high theory of mind skills to predict the true asset 
value when mispricing is low (see “HS score (std)” in regression (1)) whereas it hurts 
forecasting performance for those with high theory of mind when mispricing is high (see 
“HS score (std)” in regression (3)). In the absence of a complete display, HS scores impact 
forecasting errors negatively (see regressions (2) and (4)). 






















































(std) × MAD 




MAD     0.77*** 0.78*** 
     (0.03) (0.02) 
Male Dummy 8.78* -9.12** -1.73 -7.16 4.05 -8.08*** 













































Asset Value -0.05* -0.04*** 0.06*** 0.03*** -0.01 -0.03*** 













Observations 960 2,786 960 2,788 1,920 5,574 
R-squared 0.141 0.0802 0.274 0.172 0.571 0.541 
Robust standard errors in parentheses with session and time fixed effects included as well as random effects for 
each subject.  (std) indicates a standardized variable. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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We verify the robustness of the results in Table 6 by using the weight forecasting accuracy 
(see Table C18 in Appendix C) as the dependent variable, and by adding individual and 
market controls (see Tables C19 and C20). When the weight forecasting accuracy is the 
dependent variable, “HS score (std) × MAD” has a similar implication to that shown in Table 
6, but is only marginally significant (regression (5) in Table C18).31 The main finding that 
graphical display plays a role in moderating the effect of theory of mind skills (HS) on 
forecasting performance continues to hold if we distinguish between dynamic and static 
displays instead of between complete and non-complete displays (see Table C22). This 
distinction is relevant for testing Hypothesis 1ii according to which pattern recognition 
skills, as measured with HS, will be especially crucial in explaining forecasting performance 
when the display prompts the identification of graphical patterns in the data. As was the 
case for Table 5, the results in Table 6 do not hold for the eye-gaze test (see Table C23). The 
reason the coefficient for “Eye-gaze score (std) × MAD” does not depend on the graphical 
display could be because the Eye-gaze test does not measure pattern recognition skills in 
the way the HS test does. We summarize our findings with respect to the mechanisms 
underlying the relationship between theory of mind skills and forecasting performance as 
our second result. 
Result 2 (Theory of Mind, Mispricing, Graphical Display & Forecasting Performance) 
i) Theory of mind skills (HS) enhance forecasting performance when mispricing is low. 
ii) Theory of mind skills (HS) hurt forecasting performance when mispricing is high and 
the graphical display is complete. 
 
To test Hypotheses 2 & 3, we replicate Table 5 for the case of standard cognitive skills and 
extraversion. In Table 7, we show that standard cognitive skills (intelligence tests scores) 
predict forecasting performance significantly when mispricing is low (see “Intelligence 
score (std)” in regression (1)) whereas this is not the case when mispricing is high (see 
regression (2)). Unlike theory of mind skills and in line with Hypothesis 2, intelligence 
scores do not hurt forecasting when mispricing is high. In addition, the interaction effect 
 
31 The results in Table 5 also hold when using the interaction variable “HS score (std) × MAD Dummy”, 




“Intelligence score (std) × MAD” in regression (3) fails to reach statistical significance (p-
value = 0.199). 













Intelligence score (std) -3.17** -1.21 -3.99** 
 (1.45) (1.64) (1.83) 
Intelligence score (std) × MAD   0.01 
   (0.01) 
MAD   0.78*** 
   (0.01) 
Male Dummy -4.54 -5.03 -4.86** 
 (3.01) (4.03) (2.33) 
Book Dummy -2.11 -1.57 -1.83 
 (4.61) (4.51) (3.27) 
Dynamics Dummy 3.19 -3.42 -0.25 
 (4.29) (4.76) (2.72) 
Book & Dynamics Dummy 6.15 11.22* 9.11** 
 (5.94) (6.71) (4.31) 
Two Insiders Dummy 22.12*** -2.22 7.69*** 
 (2.76) (2.61) (1.87) 
Six Insiders Dummy -10.78*** -101.50*** -20.84*** 
 (2.72) (3.67) (2.24) 
Asset Value -0.04*** 0.04*** -0.03*** 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Constant 39.81*** 213.23*** 34.20*** 
 (8.16) (9.34) (6.56) 
Observations 3,746 3,748 7,494 
R-squared 0.0751 0.177 0.543 
Chi-squared 517.8 2354 15783 
Robust standard errors in parentheses with session and time fixed effects included as well as 










We verify the robustness of the results in Table 7 by using the weight forecasting accuracy 
(see Table C24 in Appendix C) as the dependent variable, and by adding individual and 
market controls (see Tables C25 and C26).32 We also repeat the same analysis for CRT 
scores as we did for intelligence scores in Table 6 (see Table C28). We also find cognitive 
reflection tends to be a significant predictor of forecasting performance when mispricing is 
low but not when it is high.33 We summarize our findings regarding the relationship 
between mispricing, standard cognitive skills, and forecasting performance in Result 3. 
Result 3 (Standard Cognitive Skills, Mispricing & Forecasting Performance) 
Standard cognitive skills enhance forecasting performance when mispricing is low but not 
when it is high. 
In Table 8, we show that in line with Hypothesis 3 and unlike theory of mind and standard 
cognitive skills, extraversion predicts forecasting performance significantly when 
mispricing is high (see “Extraversion (std)” in regression (2)) but not when mispricing is 
low (see regression (1)). However, the interaction effect “Extraversion (std) × MAD” in 









32 These results also hold when using the interaction variable “Intelligence score (std) × MAD Dummy”, 
where MAD Dummy takes value one if the MAD of the market is above the median MAD of all markets (see 
regression (1) in Table C27). 
33 Unlike the case of intelligence scores, the coefficient for “CRT score (std) × MAD” in regression (3) in Table 
C28 is positive and significant. However, this might be explained by the positive correlation between CRT and 
HS (see Table 2, ρ = 0.248). Regression (4) in Table C28 shows that the variable “CRT score (std) × MAD” loses 
statistical significance when controlling for HS scores and the interaction term “HS score (std) × MAD”. 
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Extraversion (std) -0.56 -3.83** -1.40 
 (1.41) (1.63) (1.69) 
Extraversion (std) × MAD   -0.01 
(0.01) 
MAD   0.78*** 
   (0.01) 
Male Dummy -3.81 -4.27 -4.07* 
 (3.17) (3.77) (2.31) 
Book Dummy -1.56 -1.33 -1.41 
 (4.70) (4.47) (3.28) 
Dynamics Dummy 3.03 -4.15 -0.71 
 (4.29) (4.59) (2.71) 
Book & Dynamics Dummy 4.94 10.26 7.96* 
 (6.13) (6.49) (4.28) 
Two Insiders Dummy 22.12*** -2.21 7.69*** 
 (2.76) (2.61) (1.87) 
Six Insiders Dummy -10.78*** -101.48*** -20.84*** 
 (2.72) (3.66) (2.24) 
Asset Value -0.04*** 0.04*** -0.03*** 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Constant 39.47*** 213.34*** 33.94*** 
 (8.26) (9.31) (6.59) 
    
Observations 3,746 3,748 7,494 
R-squared 0.0731 0.178 0.543 
Chi-squared 467.4 2295 14674 
Robust standard errors in parentheses with session and time fixed effects included as well as 
random effects for each subject.  (std) indicates a standardized variable. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, 
* p<0.1. 
We check the robustness of the results in Table 8 by using the weight forecasting accuracy 
(see Table C29 in Appendix C) as the dependent variable, and by adding individual and 
market controls (see Tables C30 and C31).34 Unlike all our previous findings, the weight 
 
34 Results also hold when using the interaction variable “Extraversion (std) × MAD Dummy”, where MAD 




forecasting accuracy results differ from the price forecasting error results. This is 
surprising given that the correlation between the two dependent variables (price 
forecasting error and weight forecasting accuracy) is particularly high (ρ = 0.848). 
Together, Tables 7 and C29 show that, although forecasters with high levels of extraversion 
produce lower forecasting errors when mispricing is high, they are not more likely to 
identify the true state in that case. This divergence is in line with the argument that 
extrovert forecasters tend to downplay market prices as reliable signals of traders’ 
information. Instead, such forecasters might assume prices result from manipulative 
attempts or unsophisticated behavior. As a result, a high level of extraversion would lead 
forecasters to expect that the actual state is the one which is a priori most likely (i.e., 240). 
Acting on these beliefs would reduce price forecasting errors as compared to a strategy 
that places greater weight on either of the two extreme states (i.e., 50 or 490) when 
mispricing is high. However, it would not increase the likelihood of extrovert forecasters 
placing the most weight on the actual state as they would tend to systematically assign a 
high weight to state 240. Indeed, those whose level of extraversion is above the median 
place more weight on 240 than do those whose level of extraversion is below the median 
when mispricing is high (p-value = 0.004, Wilcoxon Rank Sum Test). The opposite is true 
for theory of mind skills as those with higher theory of mind skills, i.e., individuals who are 
supposedly more likely to follow price trends when mispricing is high, place less weight on 
240 than those with lower theory of mind skills (using HS, p-value = 0.073 for Wilcoxon 
Rank Sum Test). We summarize our findings regarding the relationship between 
mispricing, extraversion and forecasting performance in Result 4. 
Result 4 (Extraversion, Mispricing & Forecasting Performance) 
Extraversion reduces forecasting errors when mispricing is high but not when it is low. 
As an additional analysis, we show that there are no differences in the predictive power of 
individual skills between the two information structures that exhibit similar levels of 
mispricing (12-partially informed and 2-fully informed markets). The non-significant 
interaction coefficients between individual skills and the “Two Insiders Dummy” in Table 
C32 in Appendix C verify this pattern. This confirms that mispricing, and not the 
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information structure of markets, is the key determinant for identifying the individual skills 
that best explain forecasting performance. 
Finally, in Appendix D we report regression analyses showing no robust predictive power 
of individual characteristics for the proportion of traders possessing high CRT skills in a 
market. Regarding the prediction of the distribution of private information in the market, 
HS skills are found to significantly increase information structure forecasting accuracy 
whereas extraversion seems to decrease information structure forecasting accuracy. The 
success of HS is driven by predictions for the 6-fully informed markets (see Table D3), 
which also happens to be the information structure that forecasters are most likely to 
predict correctly (see “Six Insiders Dummy” in Table D2). In 6-fully informed markets, 
extrovert forecasters seem to fail to recognize that many traders are placing orders based 
on their private information. Extrovert traders also seem to have difficulty identifying 
those markets in which all traders possess imprecise private signals (i.e., 12-partially 
informed markets) (see regression (3) in Table D3). In fact, forecasters with high levels of 
extraversion are more likely to perceive 12-partially informed markets as being 2-fully 
informed markets as compared to those with low levels of extraversion (see regression (4) 
in Table D3). 
5. Discussion 
This paper reports the results of an experiment in which participants observe asset 
markets from prior experiments and forecast the underlying fundamental value of the asset 
being traded. In addition to the forecasting task, we use standard tests to measure the 
cognitive, emotional and social skills of the forecasters. 
To the best of our knowledge, this is the first study jointly assessing the predictive power of 
theory of mind, standard cognitive skills, and personality traits on forecasting performance. 
Our behavioral results identify that specific forecasting skills exist and thus, success is not 
simply luck. In addition, our research design lays out and tests precise mechanisms by 
which each set of skills operates. This allows us to shed light on previous results in the 
literature such as the apparent contradictory effect of theory of mind skills in different 
market contexts.  
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Consistent with our hypotheses, we find the following three patterns. First, theory of mind 
skills are beneficial when mispricing is low in the market, but harmful when mispricing is 
high. Shedding light on the underlying mechanisms explaining these results, we show that 
these effects prevail when forecasters have access to a rich graphical display because it 
supposedly prompts high theory of mind individuals to search for patterns in the data. In 
cases in which market prices reflect private information (as in BQB or Corgnet, DeSantis 
and Porter, 2018), pattern recognition techniques will be beneficial whereas the opposite is 
true if prices are uninformative (as in De Martino et al. 2013, Hefti, Heinke and Schneider, 
2018). Second, standard cognitive skills, such as fluid intelligence and cognitive reflection, 
are also beneficial when mispricing is low, but do not hurt forecasting performance when 
mispricing is high. This finding is new to the literature because a limited amount of data 
was available to date for assessing such conjecture. Third, the pattern found for 
extraversion is the opposite of that found for cognitive skills – a high degree of extraversion 
is associated with better forecasting when mispricing is high, but not when mispricing is 
low. This suggests extraversion helps forecasters disregard possibly misleading 
manipulation. This finding is also new to the literature. 
Even though our results are encouraging, more research is needed in this area to identify 
other features of the environment that could impact the relationship between individual 
skills and forecasting performance. We hope that this paper helps to spark that effort. The 
fact that the main forecasting skills (theory of mind, fluid intelligence, and extraversion) 
are virtually uncorrelated suggests heterogeneous teams could perform especially well in 
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Appendix A. Analysis of Lo, Repin and Steenbarger, 2005 and Durand, Newby and Sanghani, 2008 
We use the data in Lo, Repin and Steenbarger (2005) (80 investors) and Durand, Newby and Sanghani (2008) (21 investors) 
to show that investors score higher on the extraversion trait of personality compared to the broader adult or students 
populations. Both studies use the short version (120 items) Big-five personality test originally developed by McCrae and Costa 
(1992). We compare investors’ scores with scores from broad set of adults who took the same tests (Ypofanti et al. 2015, n = 
520) as well as two samples of students (Lim and Ployhart, 2006, n = 353 (Student I in Table A1); Donnellan et al. 2006, n = 
2,663 (Student II in Table A1)). As is shown in Table A1 below, the findings suggest that investors exhibit a level of 
extraversion which is systematically higher than the adults and students samples. 
Table A1. P-values (t-test) for comparisons of personality traits across different samples 
(in bold, significance at the 1% level) 









































































Appendix B. Instructions and Example Screenshots 
B.1. Instructions for Phase 2 of the experiment. 
Hard copies of these instructions were distributed to the participants who were given approximately 5 minutes to read 
through each set (A.1.a and A.1.b).  Participants kept the hard copy instructions with them throughout the experiment. 
B.1.a 
Introduction 
This is an experiment in the economics of market decision making.  You will be paid in cash at the end of the experiment based 
upon the decisions you make, so it is important that you understand the directions completely.  If you have a question, please 
raise your hand and a monitor will approach you.  Otherwise, you should not communicate in any way with anyone else.  
Previous Experiments 
You and everyone else who is in today’s study has previously participated in one of several earlier studies in which you could 
buy and sell shares (or certificates) of an asset in a series of trading market periods.  In those markets shares paid a dividend 
of either 50, 240 or 490 to the share’s owner.  The currency unit in the prior studies was either francs or experimental dollars 
(e-Dollars), but that is not important right now.  The value of the dividend did not depend on who owned the share and in any 
period every share paid the same dividend.    
In today’s experiment you will be observing what happened in some of those trading periods from past experiments.  Your 
task will be to accurately predict what the value of the dividend was in a trading period after observing what happened in the 
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market that period.  There will be more details later about today’s task but first we will review how the trading market works 
to refresh everyone’s memory and then we will have two practice trading periods.  
Information 
Before trading began in a market all 12 traders knew that assets can have a value of 50, 240 or 490.  In each period there was a 
35% chance the value would be 50, a 45% chance the value would be 240, and a 20% chance the value would be 490.    
Before the market period began traders could receive clues about values the asset would not have.  
In some experiments half of the traders were told one of the values the shares would not take that period while the other half 
of the traders were told the other value shares would not take that period.  These traders are referred to as partially informed.  
So for example, if a share was worth 50 then six traders were informed the shares were not worth 240 and six were informed 
the shares are not worth 490.   
In other experiments some traders were given no information while others received two clues meaning these traders knew 
the value of the shares with certainty.  For example, if the shares were worth 490 then some traders were informed that the 
shares were not worth 50 and not worth 240.  These traders were referred to as fully informed traders.  In some experiments 
half the traders were fully informed and in some experiments only two of the twelve traders were fully informed. 
Market Graph 
During every period, participants can buy or sell shares from one another by making offers to buy or to sell. The existing offers 
are shown on the Market Graph to the left.  
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Every time someone makes an offer to buy a share, a GREEN dot appears on the graph to the left. Every time someone makes 
an offer to sell, an ORANGE dot appears on the graph to the left. Once a trade is actually made, the trade will be shown as a 
BLACK dot in the graph. 






Making and Accepting Offers 
To accept an existing offer from another participant, click the Buy or Sell button in the Immediate Offer section of the screen. 
The Immediate Offer section shows you the best prices to buy, or sell, that are currently available in the market. 
To place a new offer to buy or sell you enter it into the appropriate box beside Submit New Offer and then press the 
respective button.  Any new offer to buy or sell must improve on the price that is currently shown in the immediate offer 
section. 
You cannot place an offer to buy unless you have enough cash to pay that price.  You cannot place an offer to sell a share you 
do not already own.  Your current cash and shares are displayed under Your Holdings. 
Practice Trading Periods 
We will now go through two practice trading periods.  This will not impact your payoff in any way, it is simply to refresh your 
memory with how the trading market works.  In the first practice trading period every trader will be partially informed.  In the 
second practice period some traders will be fully informed.  After these practice periods are completed, you will not interact 








Forecasting Share Value 
For 30 seconds you will observe what happened in an entire trading period that lasted several minutes during a previous 
experimental session.  The graphs you are about to see have time on the x-axis rather than the trade number as in the practice 
markets you just completed.  You will then be asked to state the chance you think the asset was worth 50, 240, and 490.  
Because the asset was worth one of these three values, your responses must sum to 100%.   
Your payoff for this prediction is determined by a scoring rule.  The formula is a little complicated, but what it means is that 
you maximize your expected payment by truthfully reporting your beliefs.  The formula is: 
Your payoff = 0.5×[ 1 + (2) × (Chance you assigned to the actual true value)  
                 – (Chance you assigned to 50)2  
          – (Chance you assigned to 240)2 
                       – (Chance you assigned to 490)2 ]. 
 
Suppose the true asset value is 490.  If you assign a chance of 20% for 50, 30% for 240, and 50% for 490, then your payoff for 
this prediction would be: 
Your payoff = 0.5× [1 + (2) × (0.50)-(0.20)2-(0.30)2 -(0.50)2] = $0.81. 
If you correctly guess the true value of 490 by assigning a chance of 0% for 50, 0% for 240, and 100% for 490, then your payoff 
would be: 
Your payoff = 0.5× [1 + (2) × (1)-(0)2-(0) 2-(1)2] = $1.00, 
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which is the maximum payoff you can earn for a prediction.  Again, although the formula is a bit complicated it is structured so 
that you maximize your expected payment by truthfully reporting your beliefs about the chances.  Also note that your payoff 
cannot be negative. 
Remember, that in each period there was a 35% chance the value would be 50, a 45% chance the value would be 240, and a 
20% chance the value would be 490.  But before trading began traders could receive more information about the value of 
shares that period.    
Forecasting Trader Information  
You will observe markets from several different experiments with different groups of traders.  But you will be shown a block 
of five trading periods that are from the same experimental session.  The trading periods you will see and the order in which 
they are shown to you is random.  Which experiments are being shown was also chosen randomly.   
After observing the block of five trading periods from a single session you will be asked to forecast how the information was 
structured in that experimental session.  That is, we will ask you to state the chance that all traders were partially informed 
(‘12 partially informed’), only two traders were fully informed (‘2 fully informed, 10 uninformed’), and half the traders were 
fully informed (‘6 fully informed, 6 uninformed’) . 





Forecasting Trader Survey Scores  
Participants in these previous trading experiments were asked several questions in a survey.  Some of those questions are 
listed below.  They may look familiar since you were also asked these questions in the past.  
(1) A bat and a ball cost $1.10 in total. The bat costs a dollar more than the ball. How much does the ball cost? 
(2) If it takes 5 machines 5 minutes to make 5 widgets, how long would it take 100 machines to make 100 widgets? 
(3) In a lake, there is a patch of lily pads. Every day, the patch doubles in size. If it takes 48 days for the patch to cover the 
entire lake, how long would it take for the patch to cover half of the lake? 
(4) If John can drink one barrel of water in 6 days, and Mary can drink one barrel of water in 12 days, how long would it take 
them to drink one barrel of water together? 
(5) Jerry received both the 15th highest and the 15th lowest mark in the class. How many students are in the class? 
(6) A man buys a pig for $60, sells it for $70, buys it back for $80, and sells it finally for $90. How much has he made? 
(7) Simon decided to invest $8,000 in the stock market one day early in 2008. Six months after he invested, on July 17, the 
stocks he had purchased were down 50%. Fortunately for Simon, from July 17 to October 17, the stocks he had purchased 
went up 75%. At this point, Simon has: a. broken even in the stock market, b. is ahead of where he began, c. has lost money. 
After observing the block of five trading periods from a single experimental session you will be asked to forecast how many of 
the participants in that session answered at least 4 of these questions correctly.  That is, we will ask you to state the chance 
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you think 0-3 people answered at least 4 questions correctly, 4-8 people answered at least 4 questions correctly, and 9-12 
people answered at least 4 questions correctly.    
Your payment for this forecast uses the same scoring rule as your other two forecasts. 
B.1.c 
Quiz 
Please select the letter of the correct answer on your computer screen.  Each correct answer is worth $0.50. 
1. Which of the following statements regarding the share value is correct? 
A. All values (50, 240 or 490) are equally likely. 
B. 50 is more likely to occur than the other values. 
C. 490 will occur on average 50% of the time. 
D. 240 is more likely to occur than the other values. 
 
2. You will observe several blocks of 5 trading market periods.  Each period within a block of 5 trading market periods 
A. Comes from the same previous experiment. 
B. Comes from different previous experiments. 
C. Has a different number of partially informed and/or fully informed traders. 





3. Choose the correct statement. 
A. You will give the chance that the number of participants who answered at least 4 of the survey questions correctly is 0-3, 4-8, 
and 9-12 after every market period. 
B. You will give the chance that the market period you observed came from a session where all traders were partially informed 
(‘12 partially informed’), only two traders were fully informed (‘2 fully informed, 10 uninformed’), and half the traders were 
fully informed (‘6 fully informed, 6 uninformed’) after every market period. 
C. You will give the chance that the true asset value is 50, 240, or 490 after every market period. 
Quiz Answers (to be read) 
Please select the letter of the correct answer on your computer screen.  Each correct answer is worth $0.50. 
1. Which of the following statements regarding the share value is correct? 
A. All values (50, 240 or 490) are equally likely. 
B. 50 is more likely to occur than the other values. 
C. 490 will occur on average 50% of the time. 
D. 240 is more likely to occur than the other values. 
Solution:  The probabilities for values 50, 240, and 490 are 35%, 45%, and 20%, respectively.  So, 240 is more likely to occur 
than the other values.  So, D is the correct answer. 
2. You will observe several blocks of 5 trading market periods.  Each period within a block of 5 trading market periods 
A. Comes from the same previous experiment. 
B. Comes from different previous experiments. 
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C. Has a different number of partially informed and/or fully informed traders. 
D. Has a different number of participants who answered at least 4 of the survey questions correctly. 
Solution:  Each period within a block of 5 trading market periods comes from the same previous experiment.  So, each period 
has the same number of either partially informed or fully informed traders.  And, each period has the same number of 
participants who answered at least 4 of the survey questions correctly.  So, A is the correct answer. 
3. Choose the correct statement. 
A. You will give the chance that the number of participants who answered at least 4 of the survey questions correctly is 0-3, 4-8, 
and 9-12 after every market period. 
B. You will give the chance that the market period you observed came from a session where all traders were partially informed 
(‘12 partially informed’), only two traders were fully informed (‘2 fully informed, 10 uninformed’), and half the traders were 
fully informed (‘6 fully informed, 6 uninformed’) after every market period. 
C. You will give the chance that the true asset value is 50, 240, or 490 after every market period. 
Solution:  You will give the chance that the true asset value is 50, 240, or 490 after every market period.  As blocks of 5 trading 
market periods are from the same previous experiment, you will only give the chance that the number of participants who 
answered at least 4 of the survey questions correctly is 0-3, 4-8, and 9-12 after each block of 5 periods.  Similarly, you will only 
give the chance that the market period you observed came from a session with 12 partially informed traders, 2 fully informed 




B.2. Instructions for Phase 3 of the experiment. 
B.2.i. Heider-Simmel Test. 
 
Movie: predict moves of large triangle 
 
In this portion of the study, you will watch a movie of three geometric objects: a circle and 
two triangles, one small and the other one large.  The objects move around, into, inside, and 
out of a box. 
 
You are asked to predict the movement of the large triangle.  The movie will be stopped 
after 5 seconds, at which point you will be given 10 seconds to choose whether, in 5 
seconds, the large triangle is going to be closer to or farther away from the small triangle 
than at present.  You indicate your choice by clicking on it. 
 
After your choice, we play the movie for another 5 seconds, stop the movie again, and a 
message will be displayed to indicate whether you won (if your prediction was right), 
or whether you pay a penalty because you failed to make a decision within the allotted 
time.  You will again be asked to predict the movement of the large triangle over the next 5 
seconds of the video. 
 




You win $1 for every correct prediction.  You pay a penalty of $0.25 for any 
failure to decide. 
B.2.ii. Cognitive Ability Test 
In this portion of the study, you will be given pattern problems to solve. For the following 
questions, you will be shown a 3 by 3 table of images with the image in the lower right 
missing. Please select the answer that best completes the pattern (i.e., the image that 
belongs in the lower right of the table).      
Images can vary according to their shape, size, color, direction, border style, and border 
corner marker. These image characteristics can change in the table in several ways:  
They can change from row to row , by column , along the diagonal 
or , and by the corner  or . 
 So the problems can be very, very difficult, like the example below. It is OK to guess.  
 
In this example, the missing image should have a light gray dashed border, since this 
characteristic changes by the corner. The border markers should be downward pointing 
gray triangles since this characteristic changes by the row. The shape should be light gray 
because this changes by the column. The three pointed side of the shape should be facing 
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up as the direction changes by the diagonal. Therefore, option “A” is the correct answer. 
Notice the shape and its size do not change.   
 
You will have 6 minutes to answer the following 12 questions, and you will receive $0.50 
for each correct answer. 
B.2.iii. Cognitive Ability Test 
In this portion of the study, you will see a square composed of 49 boxes.  Behind one of 
these boxes hides a mine; all the other 48 boxes are free from mines.  You do not know 
where this mine lies.  You only know that the mine can be in any place with equal 
probability.  
Your task is to choose how many boxes to collect.  Boxes will be collected in order (left to 
right and then top to bottom).  So you will be asked to choose a number between 1 and 49 
of boxes to collect. 
The location of the mine is random and will be revealed to you after you submit your 
decision.  
If you happen to have selected the box where the mine is located, then you will earn zero.  If 
the mine is located in a box that you did not select, then you will earn $0.10 per box you 
collected. 




B.2.iv. Eye-gaze Test 
In this portion of the study, you will view 10 sets of eyes. For each set of eyes, select which 
word best describes what the person in the picture is thinking or feeling. You may feel that 
more than one word is applicable but please choose just one word, the word which you 
consider to be most suitable. Before making your choice, make sure that you have read all 4 
words. You should try to do the task as quickly as possible. You will have 6 minutes to make 
your selections. If you really don’t know what a word means, during the task you can refer 
back to this Instructions tab which includes definitions of each word. 
Please note that a listing of all words (adjectives) along with their definitions and use in a 
sentence was also provided as part of these instructions.  Participants were able to freely 
switch between the task and this instruction set so that they could look up any words with 
which they were not familiar. 
B.2.i. HEXACO 
In this portion of the study, you will find a series of statements about you.  Please read each 
statement and decide how much you agree or disagree with that statement.  Then give your 
response using the following scale: 
    5 = strongly agree 
    4 = agree  
    3 = neutral (neither agree nor disagree) 
    2 = disagree 
    1 = strongly disagree 
Please answer every statement, even if you are not completely sure of your response. 
You will have 10 minutes to answer these questions.35 
You will then complete a short demographic survey. 
 
35 The 60 personality questions are available here: https://hexaco.org/hexaco-inventory. 
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Figures B1 through B4 provide sample screenshots from the main forecasting task by 
treatment. 
 
Figure B1. Dynamic – Book. 
 
 





Figure B3. Static – Book. 
 
 






Appendix C. Additional analyses 
All linear panel regressions use robust standard errors in parentheses with session and 
time fixed effects as well as random effects for each subject. (std) indicates a standardized 
variable. We denote: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Table C1. Weight forecasting accuracy as predicted by individual characteristics 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Intelligence score (std) 0.93*     
 (0.54)     
CRT score (std)  0.57    
  (0.43)    
HS score (std)   1.10**   
   (0.49)   
Eye-gaze score (std)    -0.11  
    (0.52)  
Extraversion (std)     0.99** 
     (0.50) 
Male Dummy 2.62** 2.35** 2.65** 2.43** 2.30** 
 (1.08) (1.08) (1.08) (1.08) (1.05) 
Book Dummy 0.72 0.80 0.71 0.61 0.55 
 (1.52) (1.54) (1.49) (1.56) (1.53) 
Dynamics Dummy 0.08 0.24 0.11 0.11 0.28 
 (1.24) (1.24) (1.21) (1.26) (1.22) 
Book & Dynamics Dummy -3.32* -3.35* -2.93 -3.00 -2.85 
 (1.98) (1.96) (1.97) (1.99) (1.96) 
Two Insiders Dummy -1.41** -1.41** -1.41** -1.41** -1.41** 
 (0.66) (0.66) (0.66) (0.66) (0.66) 
Six Insiders Dummy 31.34*** 31.34*** 31.34*** 31.34*** 31.34*** 
 (0.98) (0.98) (0.98) (0.98) (0.98) 
Asset Value -0.01*** -0.01*** -0.01*** -0.01*** -0.01*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Constant 42.75*** 42.47*** 41.98*** 42.71*** 42.76*** 
 (3.51) (3.57) (3.59) (3.57) (3.48) 
Observations 7,494 7,494 7,494 7,494 7,494 
R-squared 0.199 0.198 0.199 0.198 0.199 








Table C2. Price forecasting error as predicted by individual 
characteristics (all together) 
 (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES    
    
Intelligence score (std) -2.23** -2.19** -2.39** 
 (1.11) (1.11) (1.08) 
CRT score (std) -0.71 -0.64  
 (1.01) (1.02)  
HS score (std) -1.82 -1.84 -2.02* 
 (1.16) (1.17) (1.10) 
Eye-gaze score (std) 0.64   
 (1.19)   
Extraversion (std) -1.97* -2.04** -1.95* 
 (1.03) (1.02) (1.00) 
Male Dummy -4.87** -4.87** -5.05** 
 (2.35) (2.35) (2.29) 
Book Dummy -2.79 -2.45 -2.23 
 (2.96) (3.06) (3.07) 
Dynamics Dummy -0.92 -0.81 -0.63 
 (2.65) (2.64) (2.64) 
Book & Dynamics Dummy 9.32** 9.15** 8.81** 
 (4.19) (4.24) (4.21) 
Two Insiders Dummy 15.02*** 15.02*** 15.02*** 
 (1.92) (1.92) (1.92) 
Six Insiders Dummy -87.80*** -87.80*** -87.80*** 
 (2.01) (2.01) (2.01) 
Asset Value 0.12*** 0.12*** 0.12*** 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Constant 106.25*** 105.65*** 105.41*** 
 (9.11) (9.11) (9.12) 
    
Observations 7,494 7,494 7,494 
R-squared 0.226 0.226 0.226 






Table C3. Weight forecasting accuracy as predicted by individual 
characteristics (all together) 
 (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES    
    
Intelligence score (std) 0.92* 0.92* 0.95* 
 (0.53) (0.53) (0.51) 
CRT score (std) 0.12 0.11  
 (0.44) (0.44)  
HS score (std) 0.99** 0.99** 1.03** 
 (0.50) (0.50) (0.48) 
Eye-gaze score (std) -0.07   
 (0.49)   
Extraversion (std) 0.86* 0.87* 0.85* 
 (0.52) (0.52) (0.52) 
Male Dummy 2.68** 2.68** 2.72*** 
 (1.07) (1.07) (1.05) 
Book Dummy 0.94 0.90 0.86 
 (1.40) (1.42) (1.42) 
Dynamics Dummy 0.29 0.28 0.25 
 (1.19) (1.18) (1.18) 
Book & Dynamics Dummy -3.24* -3.22* -3.16* 
 (1.90) (1.90) (1.91) 
Two Insiders Dummy -1.41** -1.41** -1.41** 
 (0.66) (0.66) (0.66) 
Six Insiders Dummy 31.34*** 31.34*** 31.34*** 
 (0.98) (0.98) (0.98) 
Asset Value -0.01*** -0.01*** -0.01*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Constant 41.81*** 41.88*** 41.92*** 
 (3.47) (3.47) (3.47) 
    
Observations 7,494 7,494 7,494 
R-squared 0.200 0.200 0.200 





Table C4. Price forecasting error and weight forecasting accuracy as predicted by 
individual characteristics with additional controls36 
 (1) (2) 
VARIABLES Price Forecasting 
Error 
Weight Forecasting Accuracy 
   
Intelligence score (std) -2.21** 1.00* 
 (1.07) (0.54) 
HS score (std) -1.94* 1.02** 
 (1.11) (0.46) 
Extraversion (std) -1.88* 0.84 
 (1.10) (0.54) 
Male Dummy -5.80** 2.51* 
 (2.89) (1.29) 
Book Dummy -3.24 1.18 
 (3.14) (1.46) 
Dynamics Dummy -3.04 1.35 
 (2.85) (1.28) 
Book & Dynamics Dummy 11.18** -4.28** 
 (4.83) (2.10) 
Two Insiders Dummy 15.02*** -1.41** 
 (1.93) (0.66) 
Six Insiders Dummy -87.80*** 31.34*** 
 (2.01) (0.98) 
Openness (std) 0.08 -0.18 
 (1.14) (0.53) 
Conscientiousness (std) 0.79 -0.54 
 (1.00) (0.51) 
Agreeableness (std) 0.05 -0.34 
 (1.04) (0.48) 
Emotionality (std) -0.92 -0.10 
 (1.53) (0.67) 
Honesty (std) 1.72 -0.51 
 (1.20) (0.51) 
Risk Taking score (std) -0.07 -0.10 
 
36 We only include the individual characteristics which were significant predictors in Tables C2 and C3. 
Similar findings are obtained if we add eye-gaze and CRT scores to the analysis. 
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 (1.13) (0.52) 
Stock Participation Dummy37 3.07 -0.29 
 (3.49) (1.68) 
Business School Dummy38 -2.86 0.35 
 (3.13) (1.30) 
Humanities School Dummy39 1.05 -0.09 
 (4.28) (1.82) 
Science School Dummy40 3.73 -2.47 
 (4.30) (1.83) 
Asset Value 0.12*** -0.01*** 
 (0.01) (0.00) 
Constant 107.16*** 41.91*** 
 (9.34) (3.60) 
   
Observations 7,494 7,494 
R-squared 0.227 0.201 






















37 It takes value one for participants who answered ‘yes’ to the demographic question: “Do you regularly look 
at stock prices?”. 
38 It takes value one for participants who stated they were affiliated to the Business school. 
39 It takes value one for participants who stated they were affiliated to the school of Humanities. 
40 It takes value one for participants who stated they were affiliated to the school of Science. 
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Table C5. Price forecasting error as predicted by individual median characteristics 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
VARIABLES      
      




    
      
CRT Above Median Dummy  -3.52*    
  (2.07)    
HS Above Median Dummy   -4.33*   
   (2.28)   
Extraversion Above Median 
Dummy 
   -3.35  
    (2.16)  
Eye-gaze Above Median Dummy     0.04 
     (2.29) 
Male Dummy -4.62** -4.30* -4.67* -4.29* -4.42* 
 (2.34) (2.40) (2.39) (2.36) (2.40) 
Book Dummy -1.53 -2.26 -1.37 -1.79 -1.56 
 (3.36) (3.27) (3.32) (3.32) (3.35) 
Dynamics Dummy -0.36 -0.88 -0.36 -0.93 -0.27 
 (2.79) (2.72) (2.75) (2.66) (2.79) 
Book & Dynamics Dummy 8.53* 9.58** 8.14* 8.56** 8.32* 
 (4.36) (4.29) (4.32) (4.30) (4.39) 
Two Insiders Dummy 15.01*** 15.01*** 15.01*** 15.01*** 15.01*** 
 (1.93) (1.92) (1.93) (1.92) (1.93) 
Six Insiders Dummy -87.81*** -87.81*** -87.81*** -87.81*** -87.81*** 
 (2.01) (2.01) (2.01) (2.01) (2.01) 
Asset Value 0.12*** 0.12*** 0.12*** 0.12*** 0.12*** 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Constant 106.55*** 106.54*** 106.97*** 105.62*** 103.60*** 
 (9.06) (9.25) (9.46) (9.20) (9.31) 
      
Observations 7,494 7,494 7,494 7,494 7,494 
R-squared 0.225 0.225 0.226 0.225 0.225 








Table C6. Weight forecasting accuracy as predicted by individual median characteristics 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
VARIABLES      
      
Intelligence Above Median Dummy 1.49     
 (1.06)     
CRT Above Median Dummy  1.59*    
  (0.92)    
HS Above Median Dummy   1.63   
   (1.02)   
Extraversion Above Median 
Dummy 
   1.04 
(1.03) 
 
      
Eye-gaze Above Median Dummy     0.71 
     (1.07) 
Male Dummy 2.51** 2.37** 2.52** 2.39** 2.44** 
 (1.07) (1.07) (1.08) (1.07) (1.08) 
Book Dummy 0.55 0.88 0.49 0.63 0.46 
 (1.56) (1.52) (1.55) (1.56) (1.56) 
Dynamics Dummy 0.13 0.36 0.12 0.30 0.18 
 (1.26) (1.23) (1.24) (1.22) (1.24) 
Book & Dynamics Dummy -3.07 -3.55* -2.92 -3.06 -3.02 
 (1.99) (1.95) (1.98) (1.99) (1.99) 
Two Insiders Dummy -1.41** -1.41** -1.41** -1.41** -1.41** 
 (0.66) (0.66) (0.66) (0.66) (0.66) 
Six Insiders Dummy 31.34*** 31.34*** 31.34*** 31.34*** 31.34*** 
 (0.98) (0.98) (0.98) (0.98) (0.98) 
Asset Value -0.01*** -0.01*** -0.01*** -0.01*** -0.01*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Constant 41.66*** 41.49*** 41.54*** 42.19*** 42.53*** 
 (3.55) (3.60) (3.72) (3.55) (3.63) 
      
Observations 7,494 7,494 7,494 7,494 7,494 
R-squared 0.198 0.198 0.198 0.198 0.198 










Table C7. Price forecasting error as predicted by individual median 
characteristics (all together) 
 (1) (2) 
VARIABLES   
   
Intelligence Above Median Dummy -4.10* -4.54** 
 (2.26) (2.25) 
CRT Above Median Dummy -2.33  
 (2.08)  
HS Above Median Dummy -4.41* -4.59* 
 (2.33) (2.38) 
Extraversion Above Median Dummy -2.29 -2.48 
 (2.28) (2.25) 
Eye-gaze Above Median Dummy 0.24  
 (2.26)  
Male Dummy -4.72** -4.83** 
 (2.30) (2.30) 
Book Dummy -2.01 -1.51 
 (3.09) (3.23) 
Dynamics Dummy -1.28 -0.96 
 (2.63) (2.70) 
Book & Dynamics Dummy 9.35** 8.56** 
 (4.15) (4.26) 
Two Insiders Dummy 15.02*** 15.02*** 
 (1.92) (1.92) 
Six Insiders Dummy -87.80*** -87.80*** 
 (2.01) (2.01) 
Asset Value 0.12*** 0.12*** 
 (0.01) (0.01) 
Constant 113.42*** 112.17*** 
 (9.36) (9.29) 
   
Observations 7,494 7,494 
R-squared 0.226 0.226 









Table C8. Weight forecasting accuracy as predicted by individual median 
characteristics (all together) 
 (1) (2) 
VARIABLES   
   
Intelligence Above Median Dummy 1.78* 1.56 
 (1.03) (1.03) 
CRT Above Median Dummy  1.10 
  (0.94) 
HS Above Median Dummy 1.78* 1.68 
 (1.05) (1.03) 
Extraversion Above Median Dummy 0.70 0.65 
 (1.06) (1.06) 
Eye-gaze Above Median Dummy  0.61 
  (1.05) 
Male Dummy 2.60** 2.56** 
 (1.06) (1.05) 
Book Dummy 0.52 0.66 
 (1.53) (1.48) 
Dynamics Dummy 0.31 0.55 
 (1.23) (1.19) 
Book & Dynamics Dummy -3.06 -3.47* 
 (1.97) (1.89) 
Two Insiders Dummy -1.41** -1.41** 
 (0.66) (0.66) 
Six Insiders Dummy 31.34*** 31.34*** 
 (0.98) (0.98) 
Asset Value -0.01*** -0.01*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) 
Constant 39.63*** 38.75*** 
 (3.65) (3.67) 
   
Observations 7,494 7,494 
R-squared 0.199 0.199 








Table C9. Price forecasting error as predicted by individual quartile characteristics 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
VARIABLES      
      
Intelligence Top Quartile Dummy -8.72**     
 (3.57)     
CRT Top Quartile Dummy  -5.23*    
  (2.72)    
HS Above Median Dummy   -4.33*   
   (2.28)   
Eye-gaze top Quartile Dummy    2.91  
    (2.86)  
Extraversion Top Quartile Dummy     -7.91*** 
     (2.66) 
Male Dummy 3.78 1.60 -4.67* -2.90 -10.39*** 
 (3.56) (2.80) (2.39) (2.98) (3.01) 
Book Dummy -6.29 -1.85 -1.37 0.69 -6.61* 
 (5.53) (4.17) (3.32) (4.70) (3.41) 
Dynamics Dummy -5.08 1.14 -0.36 -3.25 -0.44 
 (5.09) (3.82) (2.75) (3.67) (3.22) 
Book & Dynamics Dummy 14.45** 7.49 8.14* 6.16 13.23*** 
 (7.03) (5.74) (4.32) (5.91) (4.61) 
Two Insiders Dummy 15.42*** 14.67*** 15.01*** 15.57*** 15.15*** 
 (3.41) (2.99) (1.93) (2.32) (2.74) 
Six Insiders Dummy -88.01*** -90.16*** -87.81*** -86.48*** -84.70*** 
 (3.28) (2.70) (2.01) (2.58) (3.10) 
Asset Value 0.13*** 0.12*** 0.12*** 0.12*** 0.12*** 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Constant 110.11*** 111.55*** 106.97*** 113.89*** 105.00*** 
 (13.19) (12.86) (9.46) (12.58) (12.30) 
      
Observations 3,058 3,960 7,494 4,618 3,714 











Table C10. Weight forecasting accuracy as predicted by individual quartile characteristics 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
VARIABLES      
      
Intelligence Top Quartile Dummy 3.39**     
 (1.70)     
CRT Top Quartile Dummy  1.96*    
  (1.18)    
HS Top Quartile Dummy   2.47**   
   (1.25)   
Eye-gaze top Quartile Dummy    -1.02  
    (1.27)  
Extraversion Top Quartile Dummy     3.19** 
     (1.41) 
Male Dummy -0.69 -0.08 2.28* 1.68 4.42*** 
 (1.59) (1.20) (1.37) (1.31) (1.57) 
Book Dummy 4.80* 0.67 1.43 0.05 2.16 
 (2.62) (2.02) (1.66) (1.97) (1.86) 
Dynamics Dummy 4.43** 0.08 0.08 1.09 -0.49 
 (2.17) (1.72) (1.59) (1.54) (1.55) 
Book & Dynamics Dummy -7.43** -3.64 -3.10 -2.71 -4.78* 
 (3.30) (2.63) (2.41) (2.55) (2.48) 
Two Insiders Dummy -1.01 -1.15 -1.48 -1.33* -0.68 
 (1.24) (1.04) (0.91) (0.77) (0.89) 
Six Insiders Dummy 30.05*** 31.70*** 33.21*** 31.34*** 30.55*** 
 (1.68) (1.36) (1.22) (1.26) (1.49) 
Asset Value -0.01*** -0.01*** -0.02*** -0.01*** -0.01*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Constant 41.56*** 38.12*** 43.30*** 37.96*** 42.23*** 
 (5.31) (5.38) (4.84) (4.57) (4.64) 
      
Observations 3,058 3,960 4,556 4,618 3,714 











Table C11. Price forecasting error as predicted by individual quartile 
characteristics (all together) 
 (1) (2) 
VARIABLES   
   
Intelligence Top Quartile Dummy -4.87* -5.08** 
 (2.56) (2.39) 
CRT Top Quartile Dummy -0.59  
 (2.30)  
HS Top Quartile Dummy -5.99*** -6.00*** 
 (2.10) (2.11) 
Eye-gaze top Quartile Dummy 0.70  
 (2.42)  
Extraversion Top Quartile Dummy -4.50** -4.52** 
 (2.29) (2.25) 
Male Dummy -5.92** -6.08** 
 (2.43) (2.39) 
Book Dummy -2.63 -2.55 
 (2.95) (2.97) 
Dynamics Dummy -0.72 -0.69 
 (2.64) (2.64) 
Book & Dynamics Dummy 8.83** 8.78** 
 (4.11) (4.13) 
Two Insiders Dummy 15.01*** 15.01*** 
 (1.92) (1.92) 
Six Insiders Dummy -87.80*** -87.81*** 
 (2.01) (2.01) 
Asset Value 0.12*** 0.12*** 
 (0.01) (0.01) 
Constant 111.16*** 111.27*** 
 (9.32) (9.25) 
   
Observations 7,494 7,494 
R-squared 0.227 0.227 








Table C12. Weight forecasting accuracy as predicted by individual 
quartile characteristics (all together) 
 (1) (2) 
VARIABLES   
   
Intelligence Top Quartile Dummy 2.34* 2.07* 
 (1.32) (1.18) 
CRT Top Quartile Dummy -0.75  
 (1.10)  
HS Top Quartile Dummy 2.96*** 2.97*** 
 (0.95) (0.95) 
Eye-gaze top Quartile Dummy 0.39  
 (1.09)  
Extraversion Top Quartile Dummy 1.81* 1.84* 
 (1.09) (1.09) 
Male Dummy 3.30*** 3.16*** 
 (1.12) (1.09) 
Book Dummy 0.94 1.02 
 (1.41) (1.41) 
Dynamics Dummy 0.27 0.30 
 (1.23) (1.22) 
Book & Dynamics Dummy -3.12* -3.18* 
 (1.88) (1.89) 
Two Insiders Dummy -1.41** -1.41** 
 (0.66) (0.66) 
Six Insiders Dummy 31.34*** 31.34*** 
 (0.98) (0.98) 
Asset Value -0.01*** -0.01*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) 
Constant 39.34*** 39.32*** 
 (3.58) (3.52) 
   
Observations 7,494 7,494 
R-squared 0.201 0.201 







Table C13. Price forecasting error as predicted by individual characteristics with market controls 
Amplitude of prices was calculated as the percentage difference between high and low prices in a given market. 
Average price was equal to the average transacted price in a market. Excess bids was calculated as the difference 
between the total number of bids and asks in a given market. Volume was the sum of all transactions in a market. 
 (1) (2) 
VARIABLES Price Forecasting Error Weight Forecasting Accuracy 
   
Intelligence score (std) -2.13** 0.82* 
 (1.04) (0.49) 
HS score (std) -1.76* 0.88* 
 (1.04) (0.47) 
Extraversion (std) -2.20** 0.97* 
 (1.05) (0.55) 
Male Dummy -4.82** 2.67** 
 (2.34) (1.07) 




Amplitude of prices (std) 2.31*** -2.13*** 
 (0.76) (0.32) 
Average Price (std) 9.18*** -2.04*** 
 (1.23) (0.37) 
Excess Bids (std) -2.19** 0.40 
 (0.88) (0.32) 
Volume (std) 3.32*** -4.39*** 
 (1.00) (0.40) 
Book Dummy -1.90 0.72 
 (3.20) (1.51) 
Dynamics Dummy -0.73 0.29 
 (2.74) (1.22) 
Book & Dynamics Dummy 8.54** -3.03 
 (4.27) (1.96) 
Two Insiders Dummy 0.51 4.04*** 
 (2.11) (0.74) 
Six Insiders Dummy -23.19*** 15.13*** 
 (2.21) (0.89) 
Asset Value -0.05*** 0.02*** 
 (0.01) (0.00) 
Constant 136.04*** 35.90*** 
 (7.28) (3.08) 
   
Observations 7,494 7,494 
R-squared 0.548 0.379 
Chi-squared 19316 3585 
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Table C14. Weight forecasting accuracy as predicted by theory of mind 













   
    
HS score (std) 2.12** 0.11 2.54** 
 (0.86) (0.62) (1.02) 
HS score (std) × MAD   -0.01** 
   (0.01) 
MAD   -0.18*** 
   (0.01) 
Male Dummy 3.70** 1.46 2.64** 
 (1.88) (1.18) (1.08) 
Book Dummy -0.90 2.13 0.68 
 (2.88) (1.46) (1.49) 
Dynamics Dummy -2.15 2.29 0.11 
 (2.41) (1.55) (1.21) 
Book & Dynamics Dummy -1.20 -4.06* -2.92 
 (3.62) (2.21) (1.96) 
Two Insiders Dummy -3.83*** 3.02*** 0.32 
 (1.11) (0.94) (0.66) 
Six Insiders Dummy 14.17*** 34.10*** 15.51*** 
 (1.10) (1.52) (0.89) 
Asset Value 0.02*** 0.01*** 0.02*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Constant 63.34*** 9.80*** 58.66*** 
 (4.58) (3.52) (3.12) 
    
Observations 3,746 3,748 7,494 
R-squared 0.111 0.187 0.365 







Table C15. Price forecasting error as predicted by theory of mind skills (HS) and 
mispricing with additional individual controls 
 
(1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES 
   
    
HS score (std) -4.04*** -0.13 -5.02*** 
 (1.42) (1.73) (1.53) 
HS score (std) × MAD   0.03** 
   (0.01) 
MAD   0.78*** 
   (0.01) 
Male Dummy -6.86* -4.82 -5.72** 
 (3.88) (4.19) (2.87) 
Book Dummy -2.18 -4.14 -3.12 
 (4.50) (4.55) (3.13) 
Dynamics Dummy 2.96 -8.43* -3.08 
 (4.58) (4.65) (2.82) 
Book & Dynamics Dummy 5.81 15.16** 11.10** 
 (6.64) (6.79) (4.80) 
Two Insiders Dummy 22.10*** -2.22 7.70*** 
 (2.77) (2.61) (1.87) 
Six Insiders Dummy -10.79*** -101.49*** -20.84*** 
 (2.73) (3.67) (2.24) 
Intelligence score (std) -3.47** -0.59 -2.20** 
 (1.39) (1.68) (1.06) 
Extraversion (std) -0.37 -3.28** -1.93* 
 (1.46) (1.65) (1.09) 
Openness (std) 1.25 -1.48 0.07 
 (1.73) (1.94) (1.14) 
Conscientiousness (std) 1.23 0.13 0.83 
 (1.64) (1.94) (1.00) 
Agreeableness (std) 1.52 -1.59 0.02 
 (1.39) (1.85) (1.05) 
Emotionality (std) -1.69 -0.76 -0.95 
 (2.10) (2.11) (1.53) 
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Honesty (std) -0.70 4.65** 1.75 
 (1.61) (2.02) (1.20) 
Risk Taking score (std) 0.86 -0.81 -0.05 
 (1.43) (1.72) (1.12) 
Stock Participation Dummy 0.61 4.95 2.92 
 (4.18) (6.04) (3.46) 
Business School Dummy -2.96 -3.29 -2.89 
 (4.57) (4.51) (3.11) 
Humanities School Dummy -0.90 2.65 1.03 
 (6.48) (6.01) (4.27) 
Science School Dummy -5.05 11.73* 3.71 
 (7.36) (6.11) (4.27) 
Asset Value -0.04*** 0.04*** -0.03*** 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Constant 44.81*** 215.20*** 37.00*** 
 (8.85) (9.94) (7.04) 
    
Observations 3,746 3,748 7,494 
R-squared 0.0809 0.181 0.544 














Table C16. Price forecasting error as predicted by theory of mind skills (HS) and 
mispricing with additional market controls 
 (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES    
    
HS score (std) -4.12*** -0.46 -5.27*** 
 (1.38) (1.84) (1.44) 
HS score (std) × MAD   0.03** 
   (0.01) 
Amplitude of prices (std) 2.01*** 81.60 2.31*** 
 (0.75) (51.89) (0.76) 
Average Price (std) 17.23*** -10.15*** 9.17*** 
 (3.18) (2.41) (1.23) 
Excess Bids (std) -0.28 -6.34*** -2.19** 
 (0.97) (1.56) (0.88) 
Volume (std) 8.50*** 20.77*** 3.32*** 
 (1.16) (1.91) (1.00) 
MAD   0.80*** 
   (0.01) 
Male Dummy -4.70 -4.94 -4.81** 
 (3.10) (3.92) (2.40) 
Book Dummy -2.15 -1.46 -1.73 
 (4.57) (4.51) (3.20) 
Dynamics Dummy 3.03 -3.47 -0.33 
 (4.17) (4.78) (2.68) 
Book & Dynamics Dummy 4.91 10.69 8.18* 
 (5.94) (6.68) (4.30) 
Two Insiders Dummy 9.06*** -8.60** 0.51 
 (3.24) (4.02) (2.11) 
Six Insiders Dummy -9.33*** -96.28*** -23.20*** 
 (2.74) (5.77) (2.21) 
Asset Value -0.21*** 0.06*** -0.05*** 
 (0.04) (0.01) (0.01) 
Constant 85.14*** 218.74*** 41.90*** 
 (12.36) (13.79) (7.04) 
    
Observations 3,746 3,748 7,494 
R-squared 0.0921 0.205 0.548 






Table C17. Price forecasting error as predicted by theory of mind skills 
(eye-gaze) and mispricing 
 (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES    
    
Eye-gaze score (std) -0.95 2.34 -1.08 
 (2.19) (1.76) (2.53) 
Eye-gaze score (std) × MAD   0.01 
   (0.02) 
MAD   0.78*** 
   (0.01) 
Male Dummy -3.90 -4.74 -4.37* 
 (3.14) (3.95) (2.39) 
Book Dummy -1.10 -2.49 -1.75 
 (4.32) (4.65) (3.25) 
Dynamics Dummy 3.29 -3.83 -0.40 
 (4.19) (4.69) (2.75) 
Book & Dynamics Dummy 4.84 11.21* 8.40* 
 (6.00) (6.61) (4.30) 
Two Insiders Dummy 22.12*** -2.22 7.68*** 
 (2.76) (2.61) (1.87) 
Six Insiders Dummy -10.79*** -101.50*** -20.85*** 
 (2.72) (3.66) (2.24) 
Asset Value -0.04*** 0.04*** -0.03*** 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Constant 38.52*** 215.31*** 34.45*** 
 (8.39) (9.43) (6.73) 
    
Observations 3,746 3,748 7,494 
R-squared 0.0732 0.177 0.542 























































       
HS score (std) 2.57 2.12** -1.39 0.73 2.89 2.56** 
 (1.78) (0.98) (1.04) (0.67) (2.09) (1.15) 
HS score (std) × MAD     -0.02* -0.01 
     (0.01) (0.01) 
Male Dummy -1.06 5.50** 0.25 2.12 -0.56 3.82*** 
 (3.18) (2.26) (1.90) (1.33) (2.10) (1.26) 
Book Dummy 56.69*** -0.78 14.49** 2.13 57.13*** 0.76 
 (8.77) (2.86) (5.75) (1.42) (5.30) (1.46) 
Dynamics Dummy  -2.07  2.16  0.12 
  (2.44)  (1.54)  (1.23) 
Two Insiders Dummy -1.65 -4.39*** 2.07 3.49*** 0.20 0.42 
 (2.17) (1.29) (2.40) (0.97) (1.41) (0.74) 
Six Insiders Dummy 13.17*** 14.58*** 34.81*** 34.19*** 15.40*** 15.64*** 
 (1.93) (1.30) (2.11) (1.84) (1.69) (1.06) 
Asset Value 0.02** 0.01*** 0.00 0.01*** 0.02*** 0.02*** 
 (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) 
MAD     -0.17*** -0.19*** 
     (0.01) (0.01) 
Constant  65.01***  8.30**  58.43*** 
  (5.26)  (4.08)  (3.62) 
       
Observations 960 2,786 960 2,788 1,920 5,574 







Table C19. Price forecasting error as predicted by theory of mind skills (HS), mispricing and graphical 












































       
HS score (std) -3.28 -4.23** 7.26*** -2.79 -5.32** -5.23*** 
 (2.64) (1.73) (2.25) (1.79) (2.40) (1.87) 
HS score (std) × MAD     0.07*** 0.02 
     (0.02) (0.01) 
Male Dummy 13.43** -10.89** 9.17 -9.53* 13.61*** -10.18*** 
 (5.26) (4.97) (5.61) (4.92) (4.75) (3.40) 
Book Dummy  -1.67  -5.84  -3.78 
  (4.58)  (4.33)  (3.11) 
Dynamics Dummy  3.03  -7.39  -2.52 
  (4.58)  (4.93)  (2.95) 
Two Insiders Dummy 22.74*** 21.61*** -8.59 -0.32 5.05 8.45*** 
 (5.98) (3.17) (5.77) (2.95) (3.54) (2.21) 
Six Insiders Dummy -7.53 -12.39*** -110.69*** -99.02*** -23.70*** -20.32*** 
 (5.59) (3.11) (5.34) (4.38) (4.61) (2.55) 
Intelligence score (std) 0.02 -3.44** 6.14*** -2.47 3.12* -3.25*** 
 (2.17) (1.62) (2.37) (1.67) (1.86) (1.12) 
Extraversion (std) 0.96 -1.28 -3.08 -1.71 -0.76 -1.59 
 (2.68) (1.77) (2.21) (1.84) (1.79) (1.21) 
Openness (std) 2.09 0.15 -2.15 -2.52 -0.04 -1.05 
 (2.78) (2.15) (3.81) (1.94) (3.14) (1.21) 
Conscientiousness (std) -3.11 3.05 2.23 -1.36 0.40 1.04 
 (3.24) (1.89) (2.66) (2.14) (2.23) (1.05) 
Agreeableness (std) 6.08** 1.71 4.71* -2.71 5.63*** -0.54 
 (2.48) (1.64) (2.45) (2.02) (2.15) (1.14) 
Emotionality (std) 1.49 -2.53 7.20* 0.35 6.04 -1.01 
 (3.34) (2.30) (4.13) (2.30) (3.72) (1.65) 
Honesty (std) 3.95 -1.55 10.28*** 4.40* 8.01*** 1.16 
 (2.69) (1.88) (2.87) (2.40) (2.64) (1.33) 
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Risk Taking score (std) -0.35 1.16 -3.85 -0.70 -1.64 0.05 
















Business School Dummy -14.59*** -1.01 18.14*** -9.18* 1.88 -4.90 
















Science School Dummy 24.15 -5.62 72.40*** 8.95 47.32*** 2.21 
 (16.29) (6.89) (18.18) (6.63) (14.72) (4.24) 
Asset Value -0.05* -0.04*** 0.06*** 0.03*** -0.01 -0.03*** 
 (0.03) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) 
MAD     0.77*** 0.78*** 
     (0.03) (0.02) 
Constant 47.20** 42.78*** 208.99*** 219.98*** 30.60** 39.84*** 
 (18.43) (10.41) (14.37) (11.75) (12.24) (8.17) 
       
Observations 960 2,786 960 2,788 1,920 5,574 













Table C20. Price forecasting error as predicted by theory of mind skills (HS), mispricing and graphical 










































       
Amplitude of prices (std) 3.86*** 1.53* 126.34  3.98*** 1.86** 
 (1.44) (0.88) (89.94)  (1.54) (0.86) 
Average Price (std) 13.39** 19.00*** -14.75***  3.58 10.85*** 
 (6.53) (3.65) (5.50)  (2.56) (1.41) 
Excess Bids (std) 0.03 -0.73 -4.85  -1.79 -2.48** 
 (1.67) (1.17) (3.71)  (1.51) (1.05) 
Volume (std) 4.61* 10.05*** 13.13***  -1.62 4.79*** 
 (2.40) (1.32) (3.79)  (1.66) (1.16) 
HS score (std) -5.80** -4.10** 6.44** -2.65 -7.57*** -5.14*** 
 (2.75) (1.61) (3.16) (1.95) (2.45) (1.71) 
Heider score (std) × 
MAD 




     
Male Dummy 8.69* -9.10** -1.67 -7.16 4.05 -8.07*** 
 (5.19) (3.71) (5.47) (4.66) (4.47) (2.71) 
Book Dummy  -2.34  -1.57  -1.98 
  (4.62)  (4.37)  (3.13) 
Dynamics Dummy  2.86  -3.36  -0.36 
  (4.07)  (4.79)  (2.71) 
Two Insiders Dummy 10.36* 7.41* -12.43 -0.30 1.09 0.21 
 (6.20) (3.97) (7.57) (2.95) (4.08) (2.46) 
Six Insiders Dummy -7.04 -10.96*** -108.68*** -99.04*** -24.82*** -23.08*** 
 (5.36) (3.14) (10.81) (4.38) (4.49) (2.51) 
Asset Value -0.19** -0.22*** 0.08*** 0.03*** -0.02 -0.06*** 
 (0.08) (0.04) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) 
MAD     0.80*** 0.80*** 
     (0.03) (0.02) 
Constant 82.26*** 87.98*** 227.82*** 215.38*** 40.60*** 43.48*** 
 (26.72) (13.67) (21.02) (10.72) (12.84) (7.93) 
Observations 960 2,786 960 2,788 1,920 5,574 
R-squared 0.150 0.100 0.295 0.172 0.574 0.548 
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Table C21. Price forecasting error as predicted by theory of mind skills, 


















HS score (std) -4.21*** -5.47** -4.25*** 
 (1.33) (2.60) (1.54) 








    






    
Male Dummy -4.77* 4.05 -8.08*** 
 (2.44) (4.47) (2.71) 




    
Dynamics Dummy 3.88*  -0.33 
 (2.14)  (2.71) 
Two Insiders Dummy 7.90*** 5.00 8.86*** 
 (1.89) (3.54) (2.23) 






    
Asset Value 0.03*** 0.04*** 0.02** 







    
Observations 7,494 1,920 5,574 




41 MAD Dummy equals one if the MAD for a given market is above the median of all markets considered in the 
experiment and is equal to zero otherwise. 
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Table C22. Price forecasting error as predicted by theory 












   
Heider score (std) -4.68** -6.15*** 
 (2.16) (1.99) 







MAD 0.76*** 0.80*** 
 (0.02) (0.02) 
Male Dummy -0.65 -9.60*** 
 (3.17) (3.17) 
Book Dummy 6.89** -2.47 
 (2.79) (3.11) 
Two Insiders Dummy 6.02** 9.24*** 
 (2.47) (2.86) 
Six Insiders Dummy -22.33*** -19.77*** 
 (2.84) (3.54) 
Asset Value -0.02** -0.03*** 
 (0.01) (0.01) 
Constant 31.89*** 39.67*** 
 (8.37) (9.64) 
   
Observations 3,838 3,656 





















































       
Eye-gaze score (std) -0.85 -0.61 -1.77 2.74 -0.79 -1.07 
 (3.00) (2.50) (1.90 (2.07) (3.30) (2.96) 
Eye-gaze score (std) 
× MAD 




Male Dummy 7.62 -7.88** -0.22 -6.31 4.26 -7.08** 
 (5.57) (3.71) (5.80) (4.80) (4.56) (2.77) 
Book Dummy  -1.45  -2.55  -2.02 
  (4.29)  (4.70)  (3.22) 
Dynamics Dummy  3.05  -3.81  -0.48 
  (4.09)  (4.72)  (2.76) 
Two Insiders Dummy 22.58*** 21.61*** -8.74 -0.31 4.88 8.42*** 
 (5.90) (3.16) (5.77) (2.95) (3.52) (2.21) 
Six Insiders Dummy -7.71 -12.41*** -111.30*** -99.08*** -23.82*** -20.34*** 
 (5.61) (3.10) (5.29) (4.38) (4.60) (2.55) 
Asset Value -0.05* -0.04*** 0.06*** 0.03*** -0.01 -0.03*** 
 (0.03) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) 
MAD     0.77*** 0.78*** 
     (0.03) (0.02) 
Constant 46.51*** 36.88*** 219.94*** 215.50*** 39.28*** 34.73*** 
 (17.23) (9.58) (14.59) (11.05) (11.88) (7.57) 
       
Observations 960 2,786 960 2,788 1,920 5,574 
























    
Intelligence score (std) 1.65* 0.04 2.01* 
 (0.98) (0.53) (1.20) 
Intelligence (std) × MAD   -0.01 
   (0.01) 
MAD   -0.18*** 
   (0.01) 
Male Dummy 3.61* 1.44 2.61** 
 (1.85) (1.22) (1.08) 
Book Dummy -0.91 2.12 0.69 
 (2.90) (1.47) (1.52) 
Dynamics Dummy -2.21 2.29 0.08 
 (2.47) (1.55) (1.24) 
Book & Dynamics Dummy -1.89 -4.08* -3.30* 
 (3.61) (2.23) (1.98) 
Two Insiders Dummy -3.83*** 3.02*** 0.32 
 (1.11) (0.94) (0.65) 
Six Insiders Dummy 14.17*** 34.10*** 15.51*** 
 (1.10) (1.52) (0.89) 
Asset Value 0.02*** 0.01*** 0.02*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Constant 64.71*** 9.90*** 59.12*** 
 (4.43) (3.53) (3.07) 
    
Observations 3,746 3,748 7,494 
R-squared 0.109 0.187 0.364 






Table C25. Price forecasting error as predicted by intelligence scores and 














    
Intelligence score (std) -3.47** 
(1.39) 
-0.59 -3.87** 
 (1.68) (1.73) 
Intelligence (std) × MAD   0.01 
   (0.01) 
MAD   0.78*** 
   (0.01) 
Male Dummy -6.86* -4.82 -5.72** 
 (3.88) (4.19) (2.87) 
Book Dummy -2.18 -4.14 -3.13 
 (4.50) (4.55) (3.13) 
Dynamics Dummy 2.96 -8.43* -3.08 
 (4.58) (4.65) (2.82) 
Book & Dynamics Dummy 5.81 15.16** 11.11** 
 (6.64) (6.79) (4.80) 
Two Insiders Dummy 22.10*** -2.22 7.69*** 
 (2.77) (2.61) (1.87) 
Six Insiders Dummy -10.79*** -101.49*** -20.84*** 
 (2.73) (3.67) (2.24) 
Heider score (std) -4.04*** -0.13 -1.95* 
 (1.42) (1.73) (1.11) 
Extraversion (std) -0.37 -3.28** -1.93* 
 (1.46) (1.65) (1.09) 
Openness (std) 1.25 -1.48 0.07 
 (1.73) (1.94) (1.14) 
Conscientiousness (std) 1.23 0.13 0.83 
 (1.64) (1.94) (1.00) 
Agreeableness (std) 1.52 -1.59 0.02 
 (1.39) (1.85) (1.04) 
Emotionality (std) -1.69 -0.76 -0.95 
 (2.10) (2.11) (1.53) 
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Honesty (std) -0.70 4.65** 1.75 
 (1.61) (2.02) (1.20) 
Risk Taking score (std) 0.86 -0.81 -0.05 
 (1.43) (1.72) (1.12) 
Stock Participation Dummy 0.61 4.95 2.93 
 (4.18) (6.04) (3.46) 
Business School Dummy -2.96 -3.29 -2.89 
 (4.57) (4.51) (3.11) 
Humanities School Dummy -0.90 2.65 1.03 
 (6.48) (6.01) (4.27) 
Science School Dummy -5.05 11.73* 3.71 
 (7.36) (6.11) (4.27) 
Asset Value -0.04*** 0.04*** -0.03*** 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Constant 44.81*** 215.20*** 37.60*** 
 (8.85) (9.94) (7.06) 
    
Observations 3,746 3,748 7,494 
R-squared 0.0809 0.181 0.544 














Table C26. Price forecasting error as predicted by intelligence scores and 






Below Median MAD 
(2) 




    
Intelligence score (std) -3.17** -1.24 -4.00** 
 (1.46) (1.64) (1.83) 
Intelligence (std) × MAD   0.01 
   (0.01) 
Amplitude of prices (std) 2.01*** 81.54 2.31*** 
 (0.75) (51.89) (0.76) 
Average Price (std) 17.24*** -10.16*** 9.17*** 
 (3.17) (2.41) (1.23) 
Excess Bids (std) -0.27 -6.34*** -2.18** 
 (0.97) (1.56) (0.88) 
Volume (std) 8.49*** 20.77*** 3.32*** 
 (1.16) (1.91) (1.00) 
MAD   0.80*** 
   (0.01) 
Male Dummy -4.53 -5.11 -4.85** 
 (3.01) (4.04) (2.33) 
Book Dummy -2.14 -1.61 -1.83 
 (4.62) (4.51) (3.27) 
Dynamics Dummy 3.13 -3.44 -0.26 
 (4.29) (4.77) (2.73) 
Book & Dynamics Dummy 6.24 11.15* 9.12** 
 (5.95) (6.71) (4.32) 
Two Insiders Dummy 9.09*** -8.59** 0.52 
 (3.24) (4.02) (2.11) 
Six Insiders Dummy -9.32*** -96.28*** -23.20*** 
 (2.74) (5.77) (2.21) 
Asset Value -0.21*** 0.06*** -0.05*** 
 (0.04) (0.01) (0.01) 
Constant 82.75*** 218.27*** 40.99*** 
 (12.10) (13.71) (6.87) 
    
Observations 3,746 3,748 7,494 
R-squared 0.0907 0.205 0.548 




Table C27. Price forecasting error as predicted by intelligence score, 












Intelligence score (std) -3.40** (1.60)  




Extraversion (std)  -1.20 (1.36) 




MAD Dummy42 117.26*** (2.53) 
117.27*** 
(2.52) 
















Six Insiders Dummy -47.66*** (2.19) 
-47.66*** 
(2.19) 
   







Observations 7,494 7,494 
R-squared 0.463 0.463 
 
 
42 MAD Dummy equals one if the MAD for a given market is above the median of all markets considered in the 
experiment and is equal to zero otherwise. 
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Table C28. Price forecasting error as predicted by CRT scores and mispricing with 


















     
CRT score (std) -3.29** 0.19 -4.23*** -3.10* 
 (1.35) (1.56) (1.61) (1.68) 
HS score (std)    -4.50*** 
    (1.50) 
CRT score (std) × MAD   0.02** 0.02 
   (0.01) (0.01) 
HS score (std) × MAD    0.02* 
    (0.01) 
MAD   0.78*** 0.78*** 
   (0.01) (0.01) 
Male Dummy -3.43 -4.81 -4.16* -4.61* 
 (3.03) (3.96) (2.40) (2.43) 
Book Dummy -2.98 -1.28 -2.11 -2.16 
 (4.64) (4.43) (3.28) (3.18) 
Dynamics Dummy 2.30 -3.40 -0.70 -0.60 
 (4.12) (4.74) (2.71) (2.68) 
Book & Dynamics Dummy 7.10 10.67 9.29** 8.89** 
 (6.07) (6.60) (4.33) (4.38) 
Two Insiders Dummy 22.12*** -2.22 7.69*** 7.69*** 
 (2.76) (2.61) (1.87) (1.87) 
Six Insiders Dummy -10.80*** -101.49*** -20.85*** -20.85*** 
 (2.72) (3.67) (2.24) (2.24) 
Asset Value -0.04*** 0.04*** -0.03*** -0.03*** 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Constant 41.03*** 213.13*** 34.43*** 35.35*** 
 (8.20) (9.23) (6.64) (6.62) 
     
Observations 3,746 3,748 7,494 7,494 
R-squared 0.0752 0.176 0.543 0.543 




Table C29. Weight forecasting accuracy as predicted by extraversion 





































    
Extraversion (std) 1.66* 0.21 2.42** 
 (0.97) (0.56) (1.12) 
Extraversion (std) × MAD   -0.01* 
   (0.01) 
MAD   -0.18*** 
   (0.01) 
Male Dummy 3.05* 1.41 2.28** 
 (1.85) (1.19) (1.05) 
Book Dummy -1.20 2.11 0.52 
 (2.91) (1.47) (1.53) 
Dynamics Dummy -1.88 2.33 0.28 
 (2.44) (1.55) (1.21) 
Book & Dynamics Dummy -1.08 -4.04* -2.84 
 (3.63) (2.20) (1.95) 
Two Insiders Dummy -3.83*** 3.02*** 0.32 
 (1.11) (0.94) (0.66) 
Six Insiders Dummy 14.17*** 34.10*** 15.50*** 
 (1.10) (1.52) (0.89) 
Asset Value 0.02*** 0.01*** 0.02*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Constant 64.72*** 9.91*** 59.23*** 
 (4.37) (3.53) (3.02) 
    
Observations 3,746 3,748 7,494 
R-squared 0.109 0.187 0.364 
Chi-squared 1384 1428 3491 
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Table C30. Price forecasting error as predicted by extraversion scores and 















    
Extraversion (std) -0.37 -3.28** -1.05 
 (1.46) (1.65) (1.77) 
Extraversion (std) × MAD   -0.01 
   (0.01) 
MAD   0.78*** 
   (0.01) 
Male Dummy -6.86* -4.82 -5.72** 
 (3.88) (4.19) (2.87) 
Book Dummy -2.18 -4.14 -3.12 
 (4.50) (4.55) (3.13) 
Dynamics Dummy 2.96 -8.43* -3.07 
 (4.58) (4.65) (2.82) 
Book & Dynamics Dummy 5.81 15.16** 11.10** 
 (6.64) (6.79) (4.80) 
Two Insiders Dummy 22.10*** -2.22 7.69*** 
 (2.77) (2.61) (1.87) 
Six Insiders Dummy -10.79*** -101.49*** -20.84*** 
 (2.73) (3.67) (2.24) 
Intelligence score (std) -3.47** -0.59 -2.20** 
 (1.39) (1.68) (1.06) 
Heider score (std) -4.04*** -0.13 -1.95* 
 (1.42) (1.73) (1.11) 
Openness (std) 1.25 -1.48 0.07 
 (1.73) (1.94) (1.14) 
Conscientiousness (std) 1.23 0.13 0.83 
 (1.64) (1.94) (1.00) 
Agreeableness (std) 1.52 -1.59 0.02 
 (1.39) (1.85) (1.04) 
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Emotionality (std) -1.69 -0.76 -0.95 
 (2.10) (2.11) (1.53) 
Honesty (std) -0.70 4.65** 1.75 
 (1.61) (2.02) (1.20) 
Risk Taking score (std) 0.86 -0.81 -0.05 
 (1.43) (1.72) (1.12) 
Stock Participation Dummy 0.61 4.95 2.92 
 (4.18) (6.04) (3.46) 
Business School Dummy -2.96 -3.29 -2.89 
 (4.57) (4.51) (3.11) 
Humanities School Dummy -0.90 2.65 1.03 
 (6.48) (6.01) (4.27) 
Science School Dummy -5.05 11.73* 3.71 
 (7.36) (6.11) (4.27) 
Asset Value -0.04*** 0.04*** -0.03*** 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Constant 44.81*** 215.20*** 37.37*** 
 (8.85) (9.94) (7.05) 
    
Observations 3,746 3,748 7,494 
R-squared 0.0809 0.181 0.544 












Table C31. Price forecasting error as predicted by extraversion scores and 













    
Amplitude of prices (std) 2.01*** 81.51 2.31*** 
 (0.75) (51.90) (0.76) 
Average Price (std) 17.24*** -10.17*** 9.17*** 
 (3.18) (2.41) (1.23) 
Excess Bids (std) -0.27 -6.33*** -2.18** 
 (0.97) (1.56) (0.88) 
Volume (std) 8.50*** 20.78*** 3.32*** 
 (1.16) (1.91) (1.00) 
Extraversion (std) -0.59 -3.87** -1.42 
 (1.41) (1.62) (1.69) 
Extraversion (std) × MAD   -0.01 
   (0.01) 
MAD   0.80*** 
   (0.01) 
Male Dummy -3.79 -4.33 -4.06* 
 (3.17) (3.78) (2.31) 
Book Dummy -1.58 -1.36 -1.41 
 (4.71) (4.47) (3.28) 
Dynamics Dummy 2.97 -4.18 -0.72 
 (4.29) (4.60) (2.71) 
Book & Dynamics Dummy 5.03 10.17 7.96* 
 (6.14) (6.48) (4.28) 
Two Insiders Dummy 9.08*** -8.58** 0.51 
 (3.24) (4.02) (2.11) 
Six Insiders Dummy -9.32*** -96.25*** -23.20*** 
 (2.74) (5.77) (2.21) 
Asset Value -0.21*** 0.06*** -0.05*** 
 (0.04) (0.01) (0.01) 
Constant 82.42*** 218.37*** 40.73*** 
 (12.19) (13.54) (6.93) 
    
Observations 3,746 3,748 7,494 
R-squared 0.0886 0.207 0.548 





Table C32. Price forecasting error as predicted by individual characteristics and two 
information structures (data for 6-fully informed markets are excluded) 
 (1) (2) (3) 




Intelligence score (std) (1.58)   
 -1.41   
Intelligence score × Two Insiders Dummy (2.21)   
  -1.50  
HS score (std)  (1.58)  
HS score × Two Insiders Dummy  0.64 (2.04) 
 
Extraversion (std) 
  -1.24 
(1.22) 
Extraversion × Two Insiders Dummy   -1.41 (1.87) 
    
Male Dummy -3.00 -3.00 -2.48 
 (2.36) (2.33) (2.29) 
Book Dummy 2.41 2.46 2.64 
 (3.00) (2.95) (2.99) 
Dynamics Dummy 0.53 0.50 0.14 
 (2.86) (2.85) (2.85) 
Book & Dynamics Dummy 5.29 4.79 4.59 
 (4.03) (4.06) (4.01) 
Two Insiders Dummy 15.22*** 15.22*** 15.22*** 
 (1.94) (1.94) (1.94) 
Asset Value 0.14*** 0.14*** 0.14*** 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Constant 99.48*** 100.52*** 99.65*** 
 (11.16) (11.34) (11.20) 
    
Observations 4,994 4,994 4,994 






Appendix D. Predictions of CRT composition of markets and distribution of private 
information 
All linear panel regressions use robust standard errors in parentheses with session and 
time fixed effects. (std) indicates a standardized variable. 
We denote: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
CRT predictions 
We define the dependent variable “CRT correct” as the weight in percent a forecaster 
assigned to the category (i.e., 0 to 4, 5 to 8, and 9 to 12) that includes the correct number of 
high-CRT traders in the observed block of markets. 
Table D1. CRT correct as a function of individual characteristics 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES       
       
Intelligence score (std) 1.25** (0.60)     
1.01 
(0.62) 
       
CRT score (std)  1.04 (0.64)    
0.52 
(0.64) 
       
HS score (std)   0.53 (0.71)   
0.33 
(0.62) 
       
Eye-gaze score (std)    0.79 (0.98)  
0.51 
(0.90) 
       
Extraversion (std)     -0.02 (0.66) 
0.02 
(0.63) 
       
Male Dummy 0.53 0.13 0.36 0.34 0.23 0.58 
 (1.26) (1.30) (1.28) (1.25) (1.31) (1.27) 
Book Dummy 1.18 1.42 1.06 0.57 1.03 1.06 
 (1.81) (1.86) (1.85) (1.72) (1.84) (1.70) 
Dynamics Dummy 2.02 2.30 2.06 1.85 2.09 1.95 
 (1.64) (1.69) (1.67) (1.58) (1.74) (1.60) 
Book & Dynamics Dummy -4.70** -4.91** -4.25* -4.06* -4.32* -4.71** 
 (2.37) (2.41) (2.35) (2.28) (2.35) (2.25) 
Two Insiders Dummy -0.62 -0.62 -0.62 -0.62 -0.62 -0.62 
 (1.51) (1.51) (1.51) (1.51) (1.51) (1.52) 
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Six Insiders Dummy -4.22** -4.22** -4.22** -4.22** -4.22** -4.22** 
 (1.67) (1.67) (1.67) (1.67) (1.67) (1.67) 
Asset Value -0.01** -0.01** -0.01** -0.01** -0.01** -0.01** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Constant 41.41*** 40.97*** 41.15*** 42.18*** 41.49*** 41.40*** 
 (3.42) (3.51) (3.49) (3.48) (3.51) (3.36) 
       
Observations 1,512 1,512 1,512 1,512 1,512 1,512 
R-squared 0.0192 0.0184 0.0172 0.0177 0.0168 0.0204 

















Information distribution predictions 
We define the dependent variable “Correct Information Distribution” as the weight in 
percent a forecaster assigned to the correct distribution of private information in the 
observed block of markets (i.e., 12-partially informed, 6-fully informed, and 2-fully 
informed). 
Table D2. Correct Information Distribution a function of individual characteristics 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES       
       
Intelligence score (std) -2.00**     -1.61* 
 (0.95)     (0.91) 
CRT score (std)  -0.40    -0.58 
  (0.94)    (0.88) 
HS score (std)   2.13**   2.79*** 
   (1.08)   (1.05) 
Eye-gaze score (std)    -1.46*  -1.60** 
    (0.76)  (0.70) 
Extraversion (std)     -2.19** -2.71*** 
     (0.93) (0.92) 
Male Dummy 1.29 1.81 2.32 1.56 2.06 2.27 
 (2.25) (2.26) (2.19) (2.23) (2.18) (2.06) 
Book Dummy 1.25 1.35 1.60 2.36 1.56 2.25 
 (2.69) (2.78) (2.76) (2.74) (2.68) (2.74) 
Dynamics Dummy 2.74 2.52 2.44 3.07 2.02 2.19 
 (3.01) (3.11) (3.09) (3.12) (3.06) (2.85) 
Book & Dynamics Dummy 1.28 0.90 0.94 0.19 0.36 0.95 
 (3.88) (3.93) (3.84) (3.87) (3.83) (3.66) 
Two Insiders Dummy 1.22 1.22 1.22 1.22 1.22 1.22 
 (2.08) (2.08) (2.08) (2.08) (2.08) (2.09) 
Six Insiders Dummy 4.80** 4.80** 4.80** 4.80** 4.80** 4.80** 
 (2.01) (2.01) (2.01) (2.01) (2.01) (2.01) 
Asset Value -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Constant 33.27*** 33.36*** 31.72*** 31.90*** 33.15*** 30.33*** 
 (4.39) (4.53) (4.77) (4.66) (4.27) (4.49) 
       
Observations 1,512 1,512 1,512 1,512 1,512 1,512 
R-squared 0.0232 0.0194 0.0236 0.0212 0.0238 0.0361 




















12-partially informed & 2-
fully informed markets 
 
DEPENDENT VARIABLE Correct Information Distribution 
 
Prediction weight  
(12-partially informed)43 
     
Intelligence score (std) -0.10 -1.28 -3.64** -0.56 
 (1.50) (1.41) (1.60) (1.38) 
CRT score (std) -2.62* 0.19 0.27 0.14 
 (1.51) (1.34) (1.83) (1.37) 
HS score (std) 6.23*** 1.77 0.60 1.46 
 (1.63) (1.51) (2.07) (1.54) 
Eye-gaze score (std) -1.57 -0.89 -2.45 -1.06 
 (1.31) (1.47) (1.73) (1.44) 
Extraversion (std) -4.29*** -0.91 -3.27** -3.31*** 
 (1.38) (1.44) (1.53) (1.21) 
Male Dummy 3.30 -0.02 4.03 4.63* 
 (3.15) (2.82) (3.44) (2.61) 
Book Dummy 13.26*** -11.70*** 4.05 7.93** 
 (4.36) (3.67) (4.83) (3.98) 
Dynamics Dummy 8.43* -5.64 3.15 2.33 
 (4.82) (3.51) (5.06) (3.56) 
Book & Dynamics Dummy -10.42* 14.90*** -0.38 -7.57 
 (6.06) (5.26) (6.55) (5.01) 
Asset Value 0.01 -0.01 -0.00 -0.00 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Constant 34.03*** 33.41*** 30.64*** 29.04*** 
 (7.14) (6.12) (7.47) (4.89) 
     
Observations 504 504 504 1,008 
R-squared 0.0867 0.0599 0.0702 0.0406 
Chi-squared 58.61 47.69 38.94 59.43 
 
 
43 This is the weight in percent assigned to the 12-partially informed market category.  
